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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure in Emerging Markets: Evidence from 
Latin America 
Diego C. Cueto, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2009 
My dissertation explores the leading role of ownership structures in corporate 
governance for publicly traded firms in emerging markets. I analyze the relationships 
between ownership structures, corporate governance mechanisms, firm value and market 
liquidity for a sample of Latin American firms. The predominant highly concentrated 
ownership within a context of weak shareholder protection provides a rich environment 
to explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. The period of analysis, 
2000-2006, is characterized by economic growth sustained by the expansion of foreign 
direct investment in a post-privatization era. The region as a whole, rather than just 
individual markets, became an attractive investment destination. In addition the 
development of a private pension system initiated in Chile and subsequently expanded to 
more than 25 countries (the AFP system) reinvigorated the capital markets which have 
become more attractive as a means of diversification for global portfolios. Moreover, 
understanding the implications of concentrated ownership structures is fundamental for 
participants in a yet incipient mergers and acquisitions market. My dissertation consists 
of three related essays which collectively cohere to represent my research approach and 
understanding of the topic and they all benefit from the exploitation of a unique 
ownership database. This work serves to advance the finance literature in several 
iii 
dimensions: a) the manuscript examines at markets which have hitherto been ignored or 
at best simply characterized as having very weak governance structures; b) it addresses 
endogeneity problems from the initial design of this research project through the data 
collection process; c) furthermore, I extend the literature on the interactions between 
governance mechanisms and firm value; and d) it develops new corporate governance 
measures, including novel "effective" firm ownership variables for these markets. 
Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to expropriate 
minority shareholders. Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be 
attributable to discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I examine the 
extent to which dominant shareholders can divert resources for their own consumption, in 
turn reducing overall shareholder value. Given the large potential for private 
consumption, by the dominant shareholders, I also explore the motivations for outside 
investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities. 
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One of the focal points of the corporate governance literature is the leading role of 
ownership structure as a governance mechanism. In this research I study the effects of 
ownership structures on firm value and market liquidity through their interaction with 
other corporate governance mechanisms in emerging economies within a context of weak 
shareholder protection . In this introductory chapter I present the motivation for this 
research project and I outline the main contributions I provide to the advancement of the 
finance literature. I also describe the database and the challenges encountered during the 
data collection process. I develop novel measures of ownership and describe the 
aggregation process of voting rights and cash-flow rights in business groups. Finally, I 
outline the endogeneity problems and the methodological approaches used in the 
analysis. 
According to a traditional finance paradigm, the ownership of public corporations 
is widely dispersed among atomistic investors and agency problems arise between 
managers and shareholders. This paradigm is not applicable in many countries, 
particularly those in which families, business groups or governments control most 
publicly traded firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens et al, 2002; Lins, 2003; Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2005). Even in the United States, controlling shareholders govern a large 
number of firms (Holderness, 2007; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Concentrated ownership 
In emerging economies shareholders rights are protected by local stock exchanges, local securities 
exchange commissions, courts of justices and the rule of law, but these institutions are deemed to be 
weaker than in developed countries and are considered especially weak in countries under Civil Law 
regimes. 
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structures give rise to a new form of conflict of interest between dominant shareholders 
and minority shareholders. This conflict of interest is characterized by the potential for 
asset diversion from the firms to dominant shareholders, thereby reducing overall 
shareholder value. 
When the voting rights of dominant shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights, 
the conflict of interest, and the incentive for asset diversion is magnified because the 
costs of private consumption to dominant shareholders are proportionally lower than the 
costs to minority shareholders. The discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights are created and amplified by at least three mechanisms: aggregation of voting 
rights through business groups, use of multiple-class shares, and indirect ownership 
through pyramidal structures. In the latter, firms at the top of the pyramid are endowed 
with disproportionate voting rights over the cash-flow generated by firms at the base, 
inducing asset diversion from the base up (Claessens et ai, 2002). On the other hand, the 
temptation for private consumption may be limited when external financial markets are 
underdeveloped and are relatively costly sources of funds. Under these circumstances and 
when the investment requirements of growing business opportunities exceed internally 
generated funds, equity represent an important alternative source of financing. 
Consequently, dominant shareholders reduce private consumption, and may hold onto 
significant cash-flow rights to signal the quality of investments and their commitment not 
to expropriate minority shareholders. The self-control argument is consistent with the 
pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) since voting and non-voting equity are 
issued as a last resort when debt financing becomes extremely expensive in terms of 
interest rates and excessive monitoring privileges to creditors. This approach however 
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diverges from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argument of bank centered 
financial systems in which firms rely on debt finance and corporations rarely have to 
issue equity to raise funds. The identity of dominant shareholders also plays an important 
role in credibly signaling the degree of potential asset diversion. 
In this introductory chapter, the ownership structures in five Latin American 
markets: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, are characterized. The ownership 
structures predominant in the Latin American markets provide a rich environment to 
explore corporate governance practices in a regional setting. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) report the aggregated ownership by the three largest 
shareholders in Brazil (57%), Chile (45%), Colombia (63%), and Peru (39%) for the ten 
largest non-financial firms. My preliminary examination of the sample of publicly traded 
firms indicates that the largest shareholder in Latin American firms has between 4.99% 
and 100% of the voting shares, with an average holding of 53%. With such a 
concentration of voting shares, any shareholder not affiliated with the dominant 
shareholders (or shareholder group) is unlikely to gain a seat on the board, be motivated 
enough to monitor the managers, assume managerial functions, file a law suit and/or 
obtain other benefits; and a conflict of interest between dominant shareholders and 
minority shareholders is more likely to occur than agency problems between managers 
and shareholders (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Claessens et al, 2002). 
This research characterizes the ownership structures in Latin American markets 
from a new perspective which constitutes one of its contributions. In markets 
characterized by weak shareholder protection, dominant shareholders and their close 
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collaborators may assume managerial functions or alternatively, dominant shareholders 
closely monitor the managers, thus managerial ownership as studied in previous literature 
is subsumed into the ownership of dominant shareholders. Consequently, I assume that 
the managers behave in the interest of dominant shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002) and that blockholders are active monitors rather than 
passive investors (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). This framework questions the role 
of managers as independent decision makers and departs from Lins (2003), who 
examines management-controlled firms. If managers do not belong to the dominant 
shareholders' business group, they will have to co-operate with dominant shareholders 
anyway. For example, in 2005 at Ferreyros S.A.A. the largest holders of voting shares are 
two local pension funds, (13.6% and 10.87% of voting shares) and an insurance company 
(11.08% of voting shares) but the firm is still managed by the founding family. The 
managers have extensive latitude in operating and routine business decisions, but for 
strategic decisions2, the institutional investors will be consulted. To examine the 
argument of conflict of interest between shareholders I develop a number of measures of 
effective ownership concentration which constitutes another of the contributions of this 
study. First, I identify each relevant shareholder. Next, each shareholder is assigned to a 
business group. Finally, I perform separate aggregations of voting rights and cash-flow 
rights within business groups. I use these measures to study the effect on firm value and 
market liquidity of the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for 
dominant shareholders through its interaction with other governance mechanisms. 
Specifically, I examine performance effects that may be attributable to 
" Strategic decisions are defined as decisions that put at risk a significant fraction of firm resources. 
4 
discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights. I look at the extent to which 
dominant shareholders divert resources for their own consumption, in turn reducing 
shareholder value. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive 
to expropriate minority shareholders. The capability to expropriate hinges on the 
percentage of voting rights held by dominant shareholders (TOP1VR). Large holdings by 
dominant shareholders reduce the likelihood for outside blockholders to stand up and 
challenge managerial and strategic decisions. To determine the incentive to expropriate I 
compute two alternative measures of the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-
flow rights. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the 
percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders. The larger the difference, 
the greater the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. Since the GAP1 range is 
wide and includes some negative and zero values I also calculate RATI: the ratio of the 
percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. The larger the ratio, the 
lower the incentive for expropriation. In the subsequent chapters, the analysis is 
conducted using these alternative ownership concentration measures, to investigate the 
robustness of the results. In the regression analyses of firm performance the coefficient 
estimates are expected to have opposite signs for the GAP1 and the RATI specifications. 
Given the large potential for private consumption, the role of blockholders is of 
particular interest. Blockholders are defined as outside investors (excluding dominant 
shareholders) who are large enough to have a choice between whether to assume a 
monitoring role or to collude with the dominant shareholders to extract private benefits. 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) analyze the problem of monitoring 
families. My approach extends this analysis, and focuses on the parties whose role it is to 
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monitor the dominant shareholders. This research project also examines the motivations 
for outside investors to take large stakes to finance the firms' activities, while facing the 
risks of expropriation, illiquidity and under diversification. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000) find that optimal ownership structures have a single large shareholder or few large 
shareholders of similar size. Bathala, Moon and Rao (1994) suggest that the "exit" 
solution by unsatisfied institutional investors has become more difficult due to 
transaction costs and portfolios heavily weighted on firms making up the index. Since 
most of the firms in the Latin American sample are part of the local exchange index, 
increasing monitoring becomes a viable alternative. In addition, if low ownership 
concentration increases markets liquidity, facilitates takeovers, and prompt exits from 
troubled positions, blockholders are incurring in additional risk by holding undiversified 
portfolios. Therefore, some mechanisms should be in place to ensure an adequate return 
on investment, to increase shareholder protection and to reduce market undervaluation. 
In some cases, blockholders and creditors could deter excessive private 
consumption by dominant shareholders. Some blockholders, such as pension funds, have 
the potential to prevent asset diversion thereby increasing shareholder value. However, 
others may negotiate with dominant shareholders to obtain a portion of the private 
benefits. Blockholders' identity, their stake in the firm and the value of the stake with 
respect to the total value of their portfolio determine the behavior of the blockholders. To 
the extent that firm leverage is low, and blockholders collude with dominant 
shareholders, the monitoring incentive vanishes. Therefore, I also calculate the 
discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for the second and third largest 
shareholders as well as for an aggregated investor for every category in each firm. The 
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unique ownership database also allows a detailed time series analysis of the ownership 
structures. The time-series dimension of analysis counts as an additional contribution of 
this work since it exceeds by far the scrutiny present in previously published research. 
Figure 1.1 offers an understanding of the ownership concentration in these 
markets. Dominant shareholders concentrate most voting rights, leaving little room for 
blockholders (outside investors), when they exist at all. Moreover, floating shares are in 
short supply, and voting shares float less than non-voting shares. On the inclined 
coordinate plane are shown the percentage of voting rights (from right to left) and cash-
flow rights (from front to back) for dominant shareholders of firms in the sample (all 
years). Observations off the main diagonal indicate more voting rights than cash-flow 
rights for dominant shareholders, and thus an incentive for asset diversion. Dominant 
shareholders frequently choose holding voting rights that exceed cash-flow rights 
reducing the own portion of the costs of private consumption. The vertical axis indicates 
Tobin's Q ratios as a proxy for firm value. Market participants seem to attach a higher 
value to those firms in which the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights are lower. However, having a balance between voting rights and cash-flow rights is 
not enough to ensure high firm value. The variation of firm valuation along and near the 
main diagonal of zero discrepancies may represent differentials of managerial ability, 
firm characteristics, market conditions, risks associated with industry effects and country 
specific environments. Additional variability in firm valuation off-diagonal represents 
dominant shareholders' pre-commitment not to expropriate minority shareholders. The 
populated off-diagonal zone shows the requirements to finance the firms' activities 
beyond the availability of internally generated funds and debt financing, and the 
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willingness of outside investors to participate. Since similar levels of market value are 
displayed at different positions on the plane, some governance mechanisms should be in 
place to help protect minority shareholders. 
Figure 1.2 reveals the ownership concentration and interconnectedness of firms in 
the Latin American sample. It represents a sub-sample of the firms and shareholders in 
the ownership database. Minimum holdings of 5% voting shares are represented by the 
ties (arrows) between firms and shareholders. Lower shareholdings are omitted for the 
sake of a cleaner picture. Firms are represented by the circles originating the arrows 
forming the remote (small) semi-ellipse. Shareholders are represented by the circles 
receiving the head of the arrows, forming the nearest (large) semi-ellipse. We should 
focus on the number of ties (arrows) each firm originates and each shareholder receives. 
Most of the firms in this sub-sample have in common "Caixa Prev Func BB - Previ" 
(center) as shareholder, or have other shareholders in common with a firm in which 
"Caixa Prev Func BB - Previ" has a stake. These interconnected ownership structures 
motivate the analysis in a regional setting. In this case, "Caixa Prev Func BB - Previ" is a 
local pension fund. Its holdings of more than 5% of voting rights in many firms suggest 
its potential for a central role in the governance of a number of firms. Under certain 
circumstances the pension fund would exercise closer or looser monitoring, but it 
reserves the right to participate in strategic decisions (acquisitions, capital restructurings), 
consistent with its fiduciary duty towards investors and clients. There are other important 
shareholders in the region (with many ties) around the center of the figure. For example 
Cia Hering has four shareholders with more than 5% of voting shares: Invest Particip 
INPASA S/A with 22.76%, Ivo Hering with 15.82%, IPE Invest e Part Empresariais 
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Ltda. with 7.43% and Caixa Prev Func BB - Previ with 5.75%. The founder is no longer 
the dominant shareholder but it performs managerial functions. However, for strategic 
decisions the blockholders will step in. 
I also compute ownership variables to account for the level of (absolute) power of 
dominant shareholders. For example, the dummy value Control50 equals 1 for firm-year 
observations in which dominant shareholders control more than 50% of the voting rights. 
Table 1.1 provides an insight of the ownership concentration in these markets for the sub-
sample used in Chapter 3 with 935 observations remaining after the lag of Tobin's Q is 
calculated. For example, for Brazil in 2001 out of 74 firms in the sample, 55 have a 
dominant shareholder with more than 50% of voting rights. Similarly, 40 firms have a 
dominant shareholder with more than 60% of voting rights. Given such prominent 
ownership concentration, an interesting aspect to explore in Latin American markets is 
whether some firm characteristics or ownership structures attract large numbers of 
blockholders. There are a number of published academic works that study corporate 
governance mechanisms in individual countries (Canada: Switzer and Kelly, 2006) as 
well as multi-country or regional studies (East Asia: Claessens et al., 2002; Western 
Europe: Faccio and Lang, 2002; Cross-country: Lins, 2003). Some studies focus on 
developed countries while others focus on emerging or transition economies. This 
investigation contributes to the finance literature by focusing on the Latin American 
region as an investment destination for local and foreign business groups. 
Data collection remains one of the greatest challenges to conducting research in 
emerging markets. Many corporate governance studies use data from primary sources, 
9 
usually collected by hand from hard formats, are constrained to cross-sectional analysis 
and few firms, usually covering few years. Moreover, Anderson and Lee (1997a and 
1997b) discuss the different reporting conventions of four databases for US firms and 
show how the data source could affect the results in ownership studies. My analysis is 
based on a unique database that provides detailed ownership information for publicly 
traded firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. Rigorously and 
conservatively exploiting this database constitutes another contribution of this work. 
Most of the firms are part of the respective local exchange index and hence may have 
liquidity advantages and increased visibility, relative to non index firms. Those firms are 
followed by more analysts than other firms and may improve corporate governance 
practices to attract global investors seeking portfolio diversification. However, Nenova 
(2003) warns of a survivorship bias by suggesting that firms in which private benefits are 
higher could eventually delist, and Claessens et al. (2002) argue that studying only listed 
firms would create a bias in terms of ownership and firm valuation. 
The ownership database Economatica is matched to Bloomberg for financial data 
and SDC for mergers data. Stability is historically rare in a region marked by political 
turmoil and economies tied to highly volatile commodity markets. The period of analysis 
(years 2000 to 2006), is characterized by constant and stable growth for most countries in 
the region (Table 1.2). However, the relative size of the security markets lag behind those 
in developed countries (Table 1.3). From the ownership database I obtained the name of 
2261 different shareholders owners of voting and/or non-voting shares, for the initial 
sample of 329 firms. The maximum number of shareholders (Shholdrs) per firm is 18 
(three observations), with 62 observations indicating 17 shareholders, and 318 
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observations with a single shareholder. A given shareholder may occupy the dominant 
voting position in one firm, and be a marginal voting shareholder or just a non-voting 
shareholder in another firm or year. Additionally, a voting shareholder is frequently also 
a non-voting shareholder for the same firm-year, narrowing the discrepancies between 
voting rights and cash-flow rights. 
In the sample there are firms in which atomistic shareholders own just voting 
shares or just non-voting shares. With concentrated ownership, multiple-class shares 
provide vehicles to raise funds while maintaining control, therefore non-voting shares are 
most frequently traded while voting shares are rarely traded, traded at a discount, or 
traded in blocks during a negotiated change of control3. But, even in the case of public 
firms without voting shares floating, blockholders could use the stock exchanges to trade, 
or use other formal market mechanisms such as a tender offer, to transfer control. Lins 
(2003) finds that managers of Latin American firms frequently use shares with superior 
voting rights to increase the voting rights associated with their cash-flow rights. He 
reports a mean (median) of 45% (51%) of non-voting shares in the equity capital 
structures in Peru and Brazil. Nenova (2003) reports that dual-class shares are much more 
frequent in Brazil than in Chile and Lefort and Walker (1999) also indicate that dual-class 
shares are rare in Chile (7.5% of listed firms) while cross-holdings are forbidden by law. 
Valadares and Leal (2000) state that in Brazil non-voting shares are frequently more 
liquid than the corresponding common shares. They note that the Brazilian law allows the 
issuance of up to 2 non-voting shares for each voting share. Thus, in the extreme case the 
control of a Brazilian company could be obtained with 50% of the voting shares that 
Although the OECD Principles (2004) do not take a position on the concept of one-share-one-vote, they 
recommend that within any series of a class all shares carry the same rights. 
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represent only 16.7% of the total capital (control can be guaranteed with just 1/6 of its 
total capital). However, only 27% of Brazilian firms are close to the limit of non-voting 
shares. They find that 54% of equity are voting capital, but only 11 % of Brazilian listed 
firms do not have non-voting shares. 
I obtained the percentage of voting and non-voting shares for each identified 
shareholder (non-floating shares), and the percentage of voting and non-voting shares 
owned by unnamed atomistic shareholders (floating shares) as well as the total number of 
voting and non-voting shares of the firm. Voting rights are numerically equal to the 
percentage of voting shares, assuming that all voting shares entitle the owner to one vote 
as indicated by the data provider. Should this assumption not hold, the bias introduced in 
the analysis would work against obtaining significant results since dominant shareholders 
would have even more voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights than those computed. 
Cash-flow rights represent claims in future dividends. I calculate the cash-flow rights of 
each shareholder as the percentage of voting shares times the total number of voting 
shares of the firm plus the percentage of non-voting shares times the total number of non-
voting shares. The sum is divided by the sum of total voting and non-voting shares. 
When the shareholders are corporations with observable ownership structures, 
they are entitled only to the portion of cash-flow rights corresponding to their own 
dominant shareholders, but to all the voting rights. I adjust the measures of cash-flow 
rights accordingly. Since voting rights are maintained intact while the cash-flow rights 
are reassigned, these necessary recalculations likely weaken the cash-flow rights of 
corporation blockholders and ultimately increase the discrepancies between voting rights 
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and cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders. The resulting measures of voting rights 
and cash-flow rights are in line with the measures of ownership and control in Faccio and 
Lang (2002). The algorithm designed with nested steps takes care of pyramidal 
structures, cross-ownership, and diversion from the one-share-one-vote rule through the 
use of multiple-class shares. The aggregation procedure is integral, and is closer to the 
method of Lins (2003) than to Faccio and Lang (2002) or Claessens et al. (2002), that use 
the weakest link along the control chain as a measure of voting rights, and the product as 
a measure of control rights. With the weakest link approach a portion of voting rights are 
left unexercised. Lefort and Walker (1999) find that Chilean groups use relatively simple 
pyramid structures in which more than four layers are rare. They point to large 
differences between personal and corporate tax rates to explain the extensive use of 
holding companies. Valadares and Leal (2000) find that relatively flat pyramidal 
structures although common for Brazilian firms are not important means to separate 
ownership and control but to keep the control of the firm within the same family. 
One contribution of this study is to establish the identity of the shareholders. The 
identification of business groups facilitates an analysis of voting behavior by 
blockholders and allows for the calculation of aggregated voting rights and cash-flow 
rights. Business groups are ad-hoc groupings in which distinct shareholders have ties 
such that during the shareholders' general meetings (or their representatives during the 
board of directors' meetings) they will vote in the same direction in all matters, including 
actions that could expropriate other shareholders who are not members of the groups. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2005) define business groups as hybrid forms of diversified 
organizations between firms and markets, ubiquitous in emerging markets and that would 
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roughly correspond to US conglomerates. Members of the coalitions benefit, or remain 
neutral from expropriation actions in the short run but these groups have medium and 
long horizons. 
Holdings of non-voting shares by blockholders who are no members of dominant 
coalitions are common which increases the risks of expropriation. However, business 
groups partially insulate their members against expropriation by dominant shareholders. 
The difficult access to debt financing and the steep financial requirements of the firms 
motivates the offering of non-voting shares to blockholders. Even though blockholders 
are incurring in additional risk by holding undiversified portfolios, business groups 
strengthen bargaining positions, and increase the predisposition to participate in 
expropriating minority shareholders. Moreover, otherwise unrelated firms dominated by 
business groups may benefit from intra-firm financial transfers that are not necessarily 
market based, as in Claessens et al. (2002) and Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008). 
Similarly, Lefort and Walker (1999) suggest that business groups may function as 
investment vehicles thereby partially substituting for capital markets. 
First, I identify each named shareholder as member of an inter-temporal cross-
firm business group or as a stand-alone investor. Grouping shareholders in business 
groups assures that all the siblings in a family (along with spouses, cousins, parents and 
children) vote in the same direction (Claessens et al., 2002). For example in 2005, Lucila, 
Barbara, Jaime, Carolina, Eduardo, Marian, Salvador, Silvia and Patricia Gubbins G. 
each own 7.99% of voting shares of Soc. Minera Corona. The Succession Reynaldo 
Gubbins Granger owns an additional 6.5%. With a cutoff level of 10% it would appear to 
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be a widely-held firm; however it is closely controlled at 78.41%. In the same way, the 
votes of all the shares owned by a mutual fund through different financial products or by 
a bank through different branches are cast in the same direction. A mutual fund may offer 
a capital-preserving fund, a capital-growth fund, and an aggressive-growth fund to his 
clients. Through products designed to accommodate different risk-aversion profiles the 
fund invests different proportions of the capital in given markets and companies. 
Moreover, the different products may have independent flags for increasing and reducing 
exposure to idiosyncratic or market risks, but when converging as shareholders in a firm, 
their votes are aggregated. Such cases indeed occur in the database and are not merely 
theoretical. Thus, the voting rights of all members of a business group are aggregated. 
Previous works aggregated the voting rights of the three or five largest shareholders 
without analyzing the identities of each one. In that sense the careful inspection of the 
ownership data represents an advance over previously published articles. 
Second, the cash-flow rights are aggregated. Cash-flow rights of voting 
shareholders are diluted, with respect to the simple percentage of voting shares, as cash-
flow rights of other non-voting shareholders are taken into account. As a consequence, 
failing to aggregate voting and non-voting shares across members of business groups 
would result in narrower (wider) voting rights/cash-flow rights discrepancies, if the 
unaccounted percentage of voting shares were larger (smaller) than the unaccounted 
percentage of non-voting shares. Narrower voting rights/cash-flow rights discrepancies 
would work against finding significant results since dominant shareholders would have 
even more incentive to expropriate minority shareholders than that computed. Thus, 
aggregation in business groups is an important contribution of this study. Members of 
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business groups have common family names, have similar firm names likely to be 
copyrighted, or have multi-firm relations (been owners/shareholders in many firms). 
However, in some cases, by looking just at the shareholders' name it would not be 
evident why they should vote in the same direction, thus a detailed analysis is necessary 
to realize their ties. Corporate documentation, analyst reports, and previous works were 
reviewed to confirm group membership. As any matching procedure, this will also be 
imperfect. Group membership was double checked and members' voting rights are 
effectively aggregated when they meet in the same firm-year. Thus, "over grouping" is 
not expected to have a major effect; in contrast "under grouping" is more likely to occur, 
due to limitations in identifying reasonable links between shareholders. Nevertheless, the 
bias introduced in the analysis by the under grouping problem would work against 
finding significant results since dominant shareholders would have even more voting 
rights in excess of cash-flow rights than calculated. 
Then, I reorganize the newly aggregated shareholders according to the level of 
voting rights and I establish a direct correspondence between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights for each shareholder. Aggregating voting rights may consolidate the position of 
dominant shareholders, but previously dominant shareholders can also be overthrown by 
grouping siblings that become more powerful after aggregation. Finally, I assign any 
treasury stocks' voting rights and cash-flow rights to dominant shareholders. I group 793 
shareholders in 225 business groups. The most populated business group has 24 
members, the second most populated group has 17 different members, and there are 114 
groups with just two members. A given shareholder may appear in the database in 
multiple occurrences, holding shares in different firms and years, but no shareholder will 
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appear as member of two groups, nor as a group member and individually. 
Extending Faccio and Lang (2002), Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003) the 
793 shareholders members of business groups and the 1468 stand alone investors are 
further classified into five categories. The purpose of the classification is to predict their 
behavior (the direction of their votes) in cases of imminent conflict of interest between 
dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. These exclusive categories are Family, 
Corporation, Institutional Investor, Government and Other. All members of a business 
group must have the same category. When conflicting categories arise within members of 
a business group, the Family category dominates then the Government category has 
priority, and then the Corporation category. For example a family controlled corporation 
that appears as a shareholder in another firm is assigned to the family business groups 
and behaves as a family member. Similarly a government controlled bank behaves as a 
government agency when it appears as a shareholder in another firm. The shareholder 
categories represent a first level of monitoring by blockholders as they can influence each 
other, influence dominant shareholders and managers. Another level of monitoring that 
will be discussed in Chapter 3 comes from external stakeholders: creditors, analysts, 
market regulators and stock markets which represent minority shareholder interests. For 
example, when a firm decides to cross-list in foreign exchanges they may abide to 
increased financial disclosure but only in some cases. A priori, a specific behavior may 
be expected from the different categories of investors: 
Family groups, as well as individual investors (families of just one member) may 
be inclined to expropriate minority shareholders and colluding with other shareholders to 
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do so. They are short run rent seekers and treat the firm they control as they private 
realms. Nepotism is frequent, noticeable and often justifiable. However, for reputation 
concerns, they could refrain from excessive private consumption. Most of the firms in the 
sample make the local exchange index, are among the largest companies in these 
economies and have been operating for a long time; therefore I do not distinguish 
between lone founder business and true family business as Miller et al. (2007) who find 
that only the former outperform public firms in the US, for the period 1996-2000. In 
markets characterized by weak shareholder protection, initial public offers (IPOs) are rare 
and entrepreneurial initiatives, which impulse economic development and innovation are 
most often privately financed and resort to public financing for growth only after success 
can be demonstrated. 
Under the profit maximizing premise, corporations would take advantage of any 
business opportunity, whether it is building market power or expropriating minority 
shareholders in other firms in which they have controlling investments. But corporations 
have also the ability to block expropriation practices by other shareholders. Moreover, 
belonging to powerful business groups reduces the chances of being a victim of 
expropriation and increases the chances of being invited to consume a portion of the 
private benefits as in Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000). However, Claessens et al. 
(2002) claim that the managers of firms controlled by both widely-held corporations and 
institutional investors have less opportunity to efficiently divert assets. 
Members of the Institutional Investor category such as depository banks, 
investment banks, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, stock brokers, and 
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stock exchanges tend to increase the value of the firms in which they have interests. They 
presumably have the expertise and the resources to monitor, and meaningfully influence 
corporate actions and elect capable board members. Furthermore, most institutional 
investors comply with their own strict governance codes and impose governance 
standards on the firms they control, thus asset diversion and minority shareholders 
expropriation is less probable. In general, institutional investors will oppose 
expropriation, will not collude with other shareholders, and will block expropriation 
attempts. Moreover, the mere presence of institutional investors may dissuade dominant 
shareholders from engaging in expropriation activities to avoid initiating monitoring 
behavior. Even if individually institutional investors look weak or distant, a large number 
of them may get organized and join voting rights when dominant shareholders 
excessively consume private benefits. The Institutional Investor category includes local 
as well as foreign shareholders. 
Shareholders in the category Government are federal, provincial or municipal 
governments or government agencies, government banks, development agencies, and 
firms owned by governments, such as utilities or natural resources companies. They may 
form business groups, meaning in this case that their representatives, when they meet at 
the boardroom, vote in the same direction, probably following the most influential of 
them. This assumption is satisfied if most government representatives have partisan 
allegiances, are disciplined and likely to rotate from one position to another and in and 
out of political appointments. Governments behave much as institutional investors 
blocking asset diversion. However, some authors have suggested that politicians would 
appropriate private benefits or collude with the managers (or dominant shareholders) to 
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do so. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) offer a review of the relation between groups and 
politics. Government controlled firms may also obtain preferential subsidies, which could 
be of benefit to the firm. On the other hand, they are subject to greater pressure from 
unions. 
The few distinct shareholders under the category Others are institutions of 
different kinds, such as income trusts, foundations, cooperatives, religious organizations, 
active and retired employee associations, social security networks, fraternities, cultural 
foundations, universities and educational foundations. When they are not related to 
business groups, and if properly run, they behave as corporations. They are few, and 
relatively powerless, and for subsequent analysis and reporting, they are subsumed into 
the Corporation category. 
My dissertation consists of three related essays exploring the topic of corporate 
governance in emerging markets. The three essays (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) collectively 
cohere to represent my research approach and understanding of the topic and they all 
benefit from the exploitation of a unique ownership database and share the same 
variables definition. However, different econometric techniques are used in each one. In 
Chapters 2 and Chapter 3 the endogeneity problems are addressed with an appropriate 
empirical design. The endogeneity problems that plague many corporate governance 
studies arise when some regressors are not orthogonal to the error term. Several forms of 
model misspecification cause endogeneity bias. Among the most often cited causes are: 
omitted variables, simultaneity bias and errors-in-variables. While desirable, it becomes 
impracticable to control for every form of model misspecification at the same time. In 
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Chapter 2,1 attack problems caused by omitted variables while the approach in Chapter 3 
is designed to deal with simultaneity. 
In the first essay (Chapter 2), I also expand on the characterization of the 
ownership structures outlined in the introductory chapter. I directly explore the relation 
between ownership structures and firm value using panel data techniques and the 
measures of ownership concentration. I study the discrepancies between voting rights and 
cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders, as well as the voting rights for characterized 
aggregated blockholders, as determinants of firm value. Dominant shareholders are 
confronted with the decision to expropriate minority shareholders when the opportunity 
presents itself. Blockholders are defined as outside investors large enough to have the 
choice whether to assume monitoring roles or to collude with dominant shareholders to 
extract private benefits. Depending on their ownership stakes and identity (family groups, 
corporations, institutional investors or governments), blockholders may serve to either 
boost or depress investor confidence (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; Lins, 2003). Since I collect and analyze ownership data for the years 
2000 to 2006, panel data techniques provide a means to address unobserved 
heterogeneity for individual firms. I find that a discount is imposed on the value of firms 
in which the voting rights of dominant shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights, in the 
studied markets, which are characterized by weak protection for minority shareholders 
and high ownership concentration. However, valuations are enhanced for firms whose 
dominant shareholders are family groups or corporations rather than institutional 
investors or governments. The evidence suggests that the stock market discount is lower 
when other family groups and corporations assume monitoring roles similar to that of 
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creditors. Collusion between blockholders and dominant shareholders for the purpose of 
extracting private benefits of control, to the detriment of minority shareholders, is not 
evident. 
In the second essay (Chapter 3) I investigate the interactions between ownership 
structures and several corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of firm value. I 
use a simultaneous equations approach which requires computing a number of 
governance variables as instruments, in addition to the ownership measures and firm 
characteristic used in Chapter 2. As a consequence, the analysis in Chapter 3 uses fewer 
observations than in Chapter 2; it is noteworthy that all the observations from the year 
2000 are lost when I compute the first lag of the measures of firm value. The level of 
some governance mechanisms, such as takeover activity, is externally determined; while 
other mechanisms such as the ownership of dominant shareholders are decided internally 
to the firm to offset environmental mechanisms (Switzer, 2007). I use a simultaneous 
equations system to analyze the relation between governance mechanisms and firm value, 
expanding on the approach of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). Even though some 
mechanisms may not look optimal in isolation, they would be collectively optimal. The 
costs of changing dominant shareholders' ownership may exceed the benefits and it may 
be optimal to maintain control of the firm. In addition, firm value and ownership may be 
endogenously determined (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Demsetz, and 
Villalonga, 2001; Lins, 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2007). Therefore, other governance 
mechanisms adjust to maximize firm value. For example, dominant shareholders might 
decide that the firm should not issue multiple-class shares, to signal their respect of 
minority shareholders' rights. Similarly, debt financing increases outside monitoring. 
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Both mechanisms may be used by dominant shareholders to pre-commit not to 
expropriate minority shareholders. I analyze the collective effects on firm value of a 
number of endogenous governance mechanisms including ownership structures, board 
independence and firm leverage while controlling for takeover activity, country effects, 
industry effects and firm characteristics such as firm size, board size, cross-listing, 
single/multiple-class shares, dual role of the CEO as chairman of the board and stock 
return volatility. 
The third essay (Chapter 4) focuses on the effects of ownership structures on the 
liquidity of stock markets. Additional data is collected to compute liquidity measures 
from intraday trading data. Data availability limits the analysis to two countries: Brazil 
and Chile, during a three month period in 2006. The ultimate defense strategy of an 
expropriated investor is to exit the position, provided that a deep enough market exists. In 
principle, this should not be a problem for a stock in the local index. However, a run by 
blockholders may hurt minority shareholders more than the consumption of private 
benefits by dominant shareholders. Moreover, to the extent that blockholders such as 
local pension funds have few diversification opportunities and their funds increase 
overtime, they are themselves locked into their positions and would prefer increasing 
monitoring than exiting large positions and risking triggering a domino effect which 
could precipitate a market wide crisis. 
Chapter 5 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM VALUE: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter I directly explore the relations between ownership structures and 
firm value. Endogeneity problems which affect many governance studies are addressed 
with the very design of the empirical approach as opposed to just in a robustness test. 
Similarly, the analysis is conducted over alternative ownership concentration measures to 
investigate the robustness of the results. I expand on the characterization of the ownership 
structures of the firms in the sample outlined in the introductory chapter. Using panel 
data techniques, I regress firm value, as proxied by Tobin's Q, on several ownership 
variables characterizing the identity and holdings of dominant shareholders, and the 
discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights which represent the incentive 
for private consumption. I then examine the role of blockholders, including institutional 
investors and governments, and their potential for monitoring or colluding with dominant 
shareholders. 
All the countries in the Latin American sample: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and 
Venezuela have a civil law tradition as per La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Visliny (1998) and consequently are described as having weak protection for minority 
shareholders. Moreover, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) find 
that in successful stock markets private contracting is more important than public 
enforcement. When shareholders receive full disclosure of a potential conflict of interest, 
the power to vote and the means to effectively litigate expropriation may be deterred 
without relying on fines and criminal sanctions. In this context of weak shareholder 
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protection and high ownership concentration, I find that a discount is imposed on the 
value of firms in which the voting rights of dominant shareholders exceed their cash-flow 
rights. However, investors prefer dominant shareholders which are family groups or 
corporations rather than institutional investors or governments. The evidence suggests 
that the stock market discount is lower when other family groups and corporations 
assume monitoring roles similar to that of creditors. Collusion between blockholders and 
dominant shareholders for the purpose of extracting private benefits, to the detriment of 
investors, is not evident. 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review section is two-fold. The first objective is to 
position this research among the most recent and relevant ownership studies, especially 
those which investigate international firms. The second objective is to show that many 
related papers address similar problems from a variety of perspectives. This diversity of 
viewpoints corresponds to data availability which differs from country to country and is 
also affected by different aggregation algorithms. Moreover, Anderson and Lee (1997a 
and 1997b) discuss the different reporting conventions of four databases for US firms and 
show how the data source could affect the results in ownership studies. Thus, it is 
difficult to assert that managerial ownership in one paper exactly corresponds to the 
ownership of controlling parties in another paper or to the definition of dominant 
shareholders presented here. Different papers denote the same variables very differently, 
for example state ownership and government shareholdings are usually referring to the 
same type of investor. Therefore, for the literature review I maintain the original word 
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choice from the authors, and in subsequent sections and chapters I consistently use the 
terminology I suggest. 
The theoretical model of Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) for closely held 
corporations shows that the founder of the firm can use control dilution as a mechanism 
to reduce asset diversion which would be harmful for him. In their model some 
shareholders are large enough not to surrender control to the managers, but none is large 
enough to obtain control by himself. Diverting assets from the firm requires the consent 
of a coalition of blockholders, and the winning coalition minimizes its cash-flow rights. 
In their 1995 sample, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) find that 
families or the state typically control most large corporations in 27 industrialized 
economies. Additionally, the power of the controlling shareholder exceeds his cash-flow 
rights, and dispersed ownership is more of an exception in countries with poor 
shareholder protection, which tend to have a civil law tradition. The authors suggest that 
a mandatory rule of one-share-one-vote will have limited impact as long as pyramids 
remain the principal vehicle to separate ownership and control. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) investigate the cross-sectional relation between 
firm value and equity ownership for a sample of US firms for 1976 and 1986. They find 
that firm value first increases with insider ownership (alignment effects), and then it 
declines (entrenchment effects). Their sample average of inside ownership is about 
13.9% and 11.8% for each period, and the inflexion point is close to 37%). In addition, 
they do not find support for the hypothesis that blockholders have an independent effect 
on corporate value, but also cannot reject the possibility that blockholders and insiders 
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operate in conjunction. Their results however, suggest that institutional ownership 
reinforces the positive effects of insider ownership on corporate value (efficient 
monitoring hypothesis). In addition, the authors outline potential endogeneity problems: 
managers and founders can be more inclined to retain a large fraction of successful firms, 
managers of successful firms are more likely to be rewarded with additional stocks. 
Claessens et al. (2002) find that firm value increases with the cash-flow 
ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect, for their 
sample of 1301 publicly traded firms in eight East Asian economies in 1996. However, 
firm value falls when control rights exceed cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders 
(entrenchment effect). They argue that the separation of ownership and control in general, 
and not any mechanism in particular (pyramidal structures, dual-class shares, cross-
holdings), is responsible for the valuation discount. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5232 
corporations in 13 Western European countries, from 1996 to 1999. They find that firms 
are typically widely-held (36.93% of the sample) or family controlled (44.29% of the 
sample) with financial and large firms more likely to be widely-held, while non-financial 
and small firms are more likely to be family-controlled. They find that in some countries, 
widely-held financial institutions or governments are important controlling shareholders, 
but widely-held corporations control few firms. Although dual-class shares, multiple 
control chains, cross-holdings and pyramidal structures are used to enhance control of the 
largest shareholders, on average the divergences between ownership (38.48%) and 
control (34.64%) are significant in just a few countries. Closely controlled firms often 
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have a sole shareholder at the 20% cutoff level - for example in 53.99% of the European 
sample. 
In Lins (2003) management groups own on average 30% of control rights in the 
firms and are the largest blockholders in 2/3 of the sample, while non-management 
blockholders own 20% of control rights. He uses a cross-sectional sample of 1433 
publicly traded firms from 18 emerging markets in 1995, which predates my sample. The 
author finds support for the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Additionally, he finds 
evidence that large non-management blockholders can reduce the valuation discount 
associated with expected managerial agency problems thereby acting as a partial 
substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms. Finally, he suggests that 
future research should study the frequent use of non-voting equity structures in Latin 
American firms. 
Nenova (2003) analyses a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries for the 
year 1997, and develops an approach in which shareholders competing for control are 
willing to pay minority vote-owners a price up to the expected value of private benefits. 
Therefore, vote value can be identified as a lower bound for control benefits. She finds 
that control-block votes are valued at more than a quarter of company market 
capitalization in Brazil and Chile. 
Lefort and Walker (1999) describe the ownership of non-financial Chilean 
conglomerates. They consolidate the balance sheet of firms in pre-defined economic 
groups to analyze the level of firm assets that are financed by debt and minority 
shareholder equity. The authors argue that pyramids are often used to separate ownership 
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and control, and that controllers of Chilean conglomerates hold more shares than 
necessary to maintain control, suggesting potential large private benefits of controlling 
the cash-flow from subsidiaries. In addition, they find that board members are exclusively 
appointed within firms associated to their economic groups, indicating that economic 
groups do not collaborate with each other. 
Valadares and Leal (2000) show a high degree of ownership concentration for 
Brazilian public firms. The largest shareholder has, on average, 41% of the equity capital 
while the five largest have 61% for their sample of 325 firms in 1996. In 62% of the 
companies, a single shareholder owns more than 50% of the voting shares. The authors 
show that corporations are the main direct investors, while individuals are the more 
important indirect owners (through pyramid structures and cross-holdings). 
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
Many corporate governance studies are constrained to cross-sectional analysis 
whereas the contribution of my analysis is based on a unique database that provides 
detailed ownership information and financial information for publicly traded firms from 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for the years 2000 to 2006. Tobin's Q, the 
proxy for firm value, is defined as the sum of Total liabilities and Market value of equity 
divided by Total assets. After an initial inspection of the financial database I impose a 
number of restrictions on Tobin's Q to accept valid observations. First 797 observations 
for which Tobin's Q values could not be calculated are removed from the sample. Since 
outliers may bias the results and may also originate from data entry mistakes on the 
original database, I remove 26 observations that report Tobin's Q values higher than 30. 
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Then, I retain only the earliest observation per firm when Tobin's Q values are repeated. 
Tobin's Q values are computed from balance sheet items and market value of equity, thus 
identical observations may result from stale data. The remaining average firm in the 
sample has a Tobin's Q value of 1.19 and the maximum Tobin's Q value is 8.89. 
Similarly, McConnell and Servaes (1990) delete firms with Q ratios larger than 6.0; 
alternatively I could have followed Lins (2003) who censors Q at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Finally, market value data should be accompanied by measures of 
idiosyncratic risk. In this respect, I impose a filter for stock return volatility removing 
observations for which the standard deviation of monthly stock price returns over the 
previous 24 months (Volatility) is missing or zero. 
Similarly, I filter the database, considering the following restrictions of the 
ownership data. I drop nine observations for which dominant shareholders command 
100% of voting rights and also 100% of cash-flow rights because the conflict of interest 
under analysis is between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders, not within 
family members in private firms. Since dominant shareholders are aggregated entities 
created from the stock holdings of all the members of a business group, those firms 
should not have passed the volatility filter (which may have occurred due to stale data). 
Descriptive statistics for the 1179 valid observations are summarized in Table 2.14. For 
484 observations out of 1179, dominant shareholders have voting rights which are 
numerically equal to cash-flow rights. For such firms GAP 1=0 and RAT1=1 where 
GAP1 is the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of 
cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders and RATI is the ratio of the percentage 
Most variables are collected at the firm level. With multiple-class shares, security-specific measures such 
as volatility are calculated for the security traded most recently with respect to the end of the year. 
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of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. For 24 observations out of 1179, 
dominant shareholders have fewer voting rights than cash-flow rights. For such firms 
GAP1<0 and RAT1>1. Since other governance measures and firm characteristics not 
seem abnormal I keep those observations instead of removing them from the sample. A 
shortage of voting rights with respect to cash-flow rights may temporarily occur due the 
necessity of funding a new investment project. Dominant shareholders could easily 
reverse the shortage to an excess of voting rights over cash-flow rights when external 
equity financing becomes available. 
In terms of Total assets, the average (median) size of the firms in the sample is 
USD 3955 million (891 million), comparable to the size of the firms in Lins (2003). The 
average (median) firm has a leverage ratio (Leverage) of 0.54 (0.52) calculated as Total 
liabilities divided by Total assets. The range of the leverage ratio is from 0.02 to 3.11. For 
13 observations out of 1179, the leverage ratio is larger than 1 due to a negative book 
value of equity. Since other governance measures and firm characteristics are not 
unusual, I keep those observations instead of removing them from the sample. A negative 
book value of equity may reflect a capital restructuring and does not have to affect firm 
value if it is a temporary occurrence. The negative book value of equity could easily be 
reversed when the firm accumulates earnings in subsequent periods. Note that none of the 
13 observations with negative equity correspond to the 24 observations with negative 
GAP1, thus the range of both variables reflects normal business operations. Table 2.2, 
Panel A provides the geographical distribution of the sample. Brazilian (582 
observations) and Chilean firms (269 observations) are the largest, and also outnumber 
firms in other countries. Table 2.2, Panel B presents the number of observations by 
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country and year. There are 126 observations in 2006, 186 observations in 2005, 182 
observations in 2004, 170 observations in 2003, 168 observations in 2002, 174 
observations in 2001, and 173 observations in year 2000. 
Dominant shareholders depending of their identity and their discrepancies 
between voting rights and cash-flow rights may be tempted to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Blockholders are defined as outside shareholders large enough to have a 
choice between whether to assume monitoring roles or to collude with dominant 
shareholders to extract private benefits. Table 2.3 shows the frequency distribution and 
percentage of voting rights and cash-flow rights by shareholder category. Non-floating 
shares are owned by identified blockholders, as opposed to floating shares which are 
owned by unnamed anonymous atomistic minority shareholders. On average, for non-
floating shares the range of voting rights (cash-flow rights) is from 5.68% (2.25%) to 
100% (100%), with a mean of 63.91% (48.6%). Voting rights also exceed cash-flow 
rights for non-floating shares when averaging across all the shareholders of a given 
category. For example, institutional investors have, on average, 33.39% of voting rights 
but only 27.98% of cash-flow rights. On the other hand, for floating shares the range of 
voting rights (cash-flow rights) is from 0.01% (0.15%) to 94.32% (94.32%) with a mean 
of 21.23%) (32.55%o). These statistics confirm the exposure of minority shareholders to 
asset expropriation vis-a-vis dominant shareholders and blockholders. 
Another contribution of this work is the analysis of the interaction between the 
largest shareholders of the firm. Table 2.4, Panel A, shows the frequency of the voting 
rights for the three largest shareholders and their distribution in the four exclusive 
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categories (Family, Corporation, Institutional Investor and Government). Less than 
absolutely powerful dominant shareholders may decide to collude with the second or the 
third largest shareholder in the firm, to obtain, maintain or strengthen control, and/or 
expropriate minority shareholders. In 944 observations, out of 1179, there is a second 
largest shareholder -in terms of voting rights- that may monitor, challenge or collude with 
the dominant shareholder. Similarly there are 764 third largest shareholders. Thus 
blockholders may have a significant role interacting with dominant shareholders. 
Given the ubiquitous organization of business groups in many countries, Djankov, 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) suggest that the requirements for 
disclosing intra-groups transactions should be lower enough to expose them to the public 
light and to bring the transactions to the shareholders for approval. The 
interconnectedness of firms in the Latin American sample revealed by Figure 1.2 and the 
business group membership of the three largest shareholders in all four categories suggest 
that blockholders may collaborate and collude in an extra-firm scale. In the aggregation 
procedure, when I conclude that two shareholders would always vote in the same 
direction, they are assigned to a single business group. When blockholders meet in 
several firms their relations are governed by their respective categories which are 
unaffected. Although not modeled in this analysis, meeting in several firms may revise 
the incentive for blockholders to monitor each other. Thus a level of collusion higher than 
what the results suggest may occur. However the market may be impaired on its ability to 
detect and value sophisticate forms of extra-firm associations. The alternative design 
constitutes an interesting avenue for future research, which the database may allow. 
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Table 2.4, Panel B, shows the percentage of voting rights and cash-flow rights by 
shareholder category, for the three largest shareholders. In contrast, Claessens et al. 
(2002) calculate the wedge just for the largest shareholder. The dominant shareholders in 
these firms have between 4.99% (1.1%) and 100% (99.85%) of voting rights (cash-flow 
rights), and on average have 55.78% (39.48%). Thus, dominant shareholders have not 
only the capability but also the incentive to divert assets from the firm. Specifically, when 
dominant shareholders are corporations, on average, they have 53.68% of voting rights 
and only 36.63% of cash-flow rights. Since the three largest shareholders have more 
voting rights than cash-flow rights independent of their identity (except by Government 
as second largest shareholder), dominant shareholders may also rely on the complicity of 
blockholders to expropriate minority shareholders. However, from Table 2.4 Panel A, 
there are only 629 cases where the second largest shareholder is a corporation. There is 
also a chance that some of the 772 dominant shareholders in the corporation category do 
not have a second largest shareholder to deal with or that when it exists it is not also a 
corporation. In this case, communication and collusion for expropriation may be more 
difficult. Note that Table 2.4, Panel A refers to the entire sample. For example, there are 
201 third largest shareholders in the category Institutional Investor which may 
correspond or not to a dominant shareholder in the same category (191 observations). It 
may well be the case that many of the 201 third largest shareholders have not a dominant 
shareholder in the same category. The impact of blockholders as monitors for the 
dominant shareholders is studied in the analysis of this and subsequent chapters. Laeven 
and Levine (2008) also explore how the identities of the parties affect their behavior 
assuming monitoring roles or colluding to expropriate minority shareholders. 
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2.3 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
The rich structure of the ownership database allows, as an additional 
contribution, a time series and cross-sectional analysis for years 2000 to 2006 as opposed 
to previous corporate governance studies which have been constrained to cross-sectional 
data. A panel data approach brings larger samples, more information and richer data that 
reflect the effects of time and market dynamics. Some firms are dropped from the sample 
when acquired or go bankrupt while others are included when they enter the market and 
are listed. Thus the panel is unbalanced. Forcing the panel to be balanced would 
introduce additional selection biases and would discard valuable information. This is one 
the first corporate governance studies to apply panel data techniques to a set of firms in 
different emerging countries5. 
When the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach is applied to a panel of data, the 
variance matrix based on independent and identically distributed (iid) errors may be 
inadequate since the error terms for a given firm are likely to be correlated over time. 
First, assuming homoskedastic disturbances I perform Breusch-Pagan (1980) Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) tests for firm specific effects (not reported), and the pooled OLS 
specification is rejected due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved 
heterogeneity refers to unobserved individual firm effects which are embedded in the 
omitted random variables and potentially correlated with the regressors. The omitted 
variables represent a form of model misspecification which could introduce endogeneity 
problems. The choice of how to compute the regression coefficients rests between a 
5
 See also Gottesman et al. (2007) for emerging markets, Jog, Zhu and Dutta (2008) for Canadian TSX 
firms, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) for Compustat firms, and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) which separates civil law and common law countries. 
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Random effects and a Fixed effects specification. The random effects specification relies 
on the strong assumption that the unobserved firm specific effects are uncorrelated with 
all the regressors while the fixed effects specification allows for unspecified forms of 
covariance. However, with the fixed effects specification the coefficients of time-
invariant regressors are not identified. Second, with the presence of unobservable 
heterogeneity established, I use a Hausman (1978) type test to distinguish between 
random and fixed effects. Under the null hypothesis of the test both the random effects 
estimator and the fixed effects estimator are consistent but the random effects estimator is 
efficient; thus any difference in the estimated variance is due to sampling error. Under the 
alternative hypothesis the random effects estimator is inconsistent. The test statistic is %2 
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of time-varying regressors. A 
large test statistic rejects the null hypothesis for given confidence levels. The test 
(unreported) rejects the random effects specification. 
The fixed effects specification, which is retained, allows for disturbances that are 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelated across time for each firm, but uncorrelated across 
firms. However, the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) approach allows for standard errors which 
are robust to general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence. This spatial 
correlation may compensate for the restrictions to directly control for country or industry 
effects under the fixed effects specification. Moreover, the ownership concentration and 
interconnectedness of firms in the Latin American sample described in Figure 1.2 suggest 
contemporaneous cross-sectional correlations for the disturbances. The Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) covariance estimator is implemented in Stata for pooled and fixed effects 
(within) regression. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) use a GMM estimator in which the 
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orthogonal conditions have been averaged across firms in each year. Then a consistent 
estimator of the variance is computed using Newey-West (1987) spectral density matrix 
estimation techniques. The structure of standard errors for coefficient estimates is 
assumed to be heteroskedastic, auto correlated up to lag (T-l=6), and possibly correlated 
between firms. Along with the within regression estimates, I also report the pooled 
regressions estimates to directly account for country effects through dummy variables. 
The purpose of the regression analysis is to provide evidence of the market 
anticipation of a potential conflict of interest between shareholders in a highly 
concentrated market. Investors assess managerial ability along with the appetite of 
dominant shareholders for extracting large benefits of control. In addition, blockholders 
may influence the firm performance. I regress a proxy for firm value (Tobin's Q) on 
several ownership variables which characterize the identity and holdings of dominant 
shareholders. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders. The capability to expropriate hinges on the percentage 
of voting rights held by dominant shareholders (TOP1VR). Large holdings by dominant 
shareholders reduce the likelihood for outside blockholders to stand up and challenge 
managerial and strategic decisions. To determine the incentive to expropriate I compute 
two alternative measures of the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights, 
to investigate the robustness of the results. GAP1 is the difference between the 
percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant 
shareholders. The larger the difference, the greater the incentive for expropriation. 
Similarly, RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of 
voting rights held by dominant shareholders. The larger the ratio, the lower the incentive 
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for expropriation. In the regression analysis of firm performance the coefficient estimates 
are expected to have opposite signs for the GAP1 and the RATI specifications. CFCON1 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if dominant shareholders are family groups 
or corporations, and zero otherwise. 
Given the large potential for private consumption, I also explore the motivations 
for outside investors to participate in the financing of the firms' activities and their 
potential for monitoring or colluding with dominant shareholders. Since blockholders in 
both the Family and Corporation categories have are a priori tendencies to collude and 
expropriate minority shareholders, I analyzed their effect on firm value both individually 
and aggregating their votes. For space considerations, I report only the results when their 
votes are aggregated since preliminary results suggest that indeed they have similar 
effects. Moreover, Table 2.4, Panel A shows a proportion of corporations among the 
three largest shareholders that is higher than in other samples. If the limitations of the 
database were overcome many corporations may result to be family controlled, by some 
of the families already identified of by new ones. Thus, the analysis results would not be 
biased by these assumptions and aggregation of votes. TOP2_3 is the percentage of 
voting rights held by the second (or third) largest shareholder provided that it is not an 
institutional investor or government. BHS is the sum of the percentage of voting rights 
held by all blockholders within the family and corporation categories, excluding 
dominant shareholders. BHD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an aggregated 
blockholder exists, as defined by BHS, and zero otherwise. INSOWN is the percentage of 
voting rights held by institutional investors excluding dominant shareholders and 
GOVOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by governments excluding dominant 
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shareholders. Since institutional investors and governments have similar a priori behavior 
oriented towards monitoring dominant shareholders I also aggregate their votes. 
CIGOWN = INSOWN + GOVOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by combined 
institutional investors and governments excluding dominant shareholders. 
The specification of the regressions includes year dummies, and for the pooled 
regressions, country dummies. I use country dummies to capture differences in sovereign 
risk, political risk, operation of financial markets, regulatory environments and corporate 
governance approaches. The country and year of comparison are Brazil and 2000 
respectively. I control for differences in firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of 
Total assets (LSIZE); leverage levels computed as Total liabilities divided by Total assets 
(Leverage), and idiosyncratic risk as measured by the standard deviation of monthly 
stock price returns over the previous 24 months (Volatility). With very few firms paying 
dividends, stock price return volatility is a consistent measure of idiosyncratic risk 
2.4 RESULTS 
Table 2.5 provides the correlation matrix of the variables in the regression 
analysis. The negative correlations between dominant shareholders' voting rights and 
blockholders' voting rights (p range between -0.6090 and -0.1250) are indications of the 
ownership concentration in these markets as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 since 
blockholders can only buy shares left by dominant shareholders. The negative correlation 
involving dominant shareholders' discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights and blockholders' voting rights (p range between -0.3158 and -0.0711) reflect the 
resistance from blockholders to invest in firms with large potential for private 
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consumption by dominant shareholders. Finally, the potential monitoring role for 
blockholders is indicated by the positive correlation coefficient between firm value and 
voting rights for blockholders (p= 0.0608). 
The analysis is conducted over alternative ownership concentration measures, to 
investigate the robustness of the results. In particular I do not use sub-sample techniques 
to run robustness tests, because the database is already small, and proper filters were used 
to remove outliers and invalid data points, thus all the remaining data contain valuable 
information. Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 provide regression results for alternative model 
specifications and variable definitions. In addition, each table presents two sets of results: 
the OLS and the within (fixed effects) coefficient estimates. In Table 2.6, the dependent 
variable is the percentage of voting rights held by dominant shareholders (TOP1VR) 
which represents the capability to expropriate minority shareholders. In Tables 2.7 and 
2.8, the dependent variables are the two alternative measures of the discrepancies 
between voting rights and cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders (GAP1 and RATI 
respectively) which represent the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. GAP1 is 
the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow 
rights held by dominant shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow 
rights to the percentage of voting rights held by dominant shareholders. Laeven and 
Levine (2008) also present results based on both differences and ratios of voting rights 
/cash-flow rights. 
The negative and significant estimated coefficients of TOPI VR and GAP1, in 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 indicate the pessimism of market participants about high ownership 
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concentration. Consistently, the cash-flow rights/voting rights ratio (RATI) is positively 
related to firm value in Tables 2.6 and 2.8. Since asset diversion is inefficient, market 
participants seem to appreciate that dominant shareholders accumulate cash-flow rights 
thereby reducing their incentive for private consumption. The results are consistent with 
those in Lins (2003), who concludes that the costs of the private consumption are 
capitalized into share prices in emerging markets. He shows that firm value declines as 
the separation of management groups' control and cash-flow rights increases. Claessens 
et al. (2002) also find that firm value falls when control rights exceeded cash-flow rights 
for dominant shareholders. 
The positive estimated coefficients of CFCON1, suggests that despite high 
ownership concentration, market participants prefer dominant shareholders which are 
family groups or corporations as opposed to institutional investors or governments. The 
limited confidence towards institutional investors as effective managers or monitors may 
reflect the small weight on the total portfolio represented by the stake on the firm. 
Therefore, despite the difficulty for institutional investors to divert funds away from the 
firm, the managers may have more freedom for decision making and returning to 
traditional forms of conflict of interest. Similarly, firms dominated by governments may 
pursue political agendas, not in line with shareholder wealth maximization, and are more 
difficult to discipline. However, Durnev and Guriev (2008) suggest that state ownership 
reduces the risk of government expropriation, thus reducing the incentive to hide earnings 
and liquid assets that could be seized, increasing overall corporate governance. 
The positive (but not always significant) estimated coefficients of TOP2_3 and 
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BHS in Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 indicate that blockholders may exercise effective 
monitoring and collaborate with dominant shareholders providing managerial expertise 
and access to product markets rather than colluding with dominant shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders. This result is consistent with the findings in Lins 
(2003) who obtains evidence that large non-management blockholders can reduce the 
valuation discount associated with expected managerial agency problems thereby acting 
as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms. Although 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) can not reject the conjecture that blockholders and insider 
ownership operate in conjunction, their results, however, do suggest that institutional 
ownership reinforces the positive effects of insider ownership on corporate value 
(efficient monitoring hypothesis). However, the influence of blockholders is conditioned 
by their identity and only family groups and corporations have positive effects on firm 
value. Moreover, the effects on firm value are characterized by the size of their stake in 
the firm. The mere presence of a potential monitor is not sufficient to increase market 
confidence, as indicated by the insignificance of the estimated coefficients of BHD. 
Laeven and Levine (2008) also find a monitoring role for blockholders. Specifically, they 
show that many publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners and that less 
disperse cash-flow rights increase the incentive for blockholders to monitor dominant 
shareholders. 
In addition, the role of institutional investors and governments as efficient 
monitoring agents is questioned by the negative and often insignificant estimated 
coefficients of CIGOWN, INSOWN and GOVOWN in Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. They are 
perceived not only as poor monitors, but also as potential obstacles to pursuing 
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investment projects with positive net present value, because they would be extra-
conservative, extremely risk averse, and would lengthen vital decision making processes. 
On the other hand, the positive estimated coefficients of Leverage point to an increased 
monitoring role by creditors since firms with high levels of debt pre-commit to use cash-
in-hand to repay short term liabilities thereby reducing the risk of asset diversion (Jensen, 
1986). Moreover, the results indicate that incurring more debt would be perceived as a 
value creating strategy since it facilitates investment and sustainable growth. These 
findings are not without controversy since other authors find a negative effect of debt on 
firm value, but those papers analyze firms in developed countries. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I find that in a context of weak protection for minority shareholders, and high 
ownership concentration, a discount is imposed on the value of firms in which the voting 
rights of dominant shareholders exceed their cash-flow rights. However, the valuation 
discount is mitigated when dominant shareholders are family groups or corporations 
rather than institutional investors or governments. Such a preference may reflect 
managerial expertise, efficiency and/or enhanced access to product markets. The 
evidence suggests that the stock market discount is also lower when other family groups 
and corporations assume monitoring roles similar to that of creditors. On the other hand, 
institutional investors and governments are not perceived as efficient corporate monitors. 
Collusion between blockholders and dominant shareholders for the purpose of extracting 
private benefits, to the detriment of minority shareholders, is not evident. 
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Chapter 3 
SUBSTITUTABILITY VS. COMPLEMENTARITY AMONG CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Emerging economies are typically characterized by weak shareholder protection 
and highly concentrated ownership structures which are relatively stable over time. With 
concentrated ownership, the conflict of interest shifts from the principal-agent problem to 
a dominant-minority shareholder focus. Therefore, assuming that the managers behave in 
the interest of dominant shareholders as in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2002), dominant shareholders may take advantage of inside information, in the 
pursuit of their personal strategies and objectives which sometimes collide with those of 
minority shareholders. The conflict of interest between shareholders is characterized as 
the potential for asset diversion from the firm to dominant shareholders, reducing overall 
firm value. Dominant shareholders may reduce their proportional share of the costs of 
private consumption by widening the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow 
rights. The separation of ownership and control allows investors to diversify their 
portfolios, and permits firms to reach a large investor base, thereby lowering the cost of 
future capital. However, the delegation of control causes anxiety to investors who 
implement strategies to align the interests of dominant shareholders with their own 
interests. 
Investors channel their monitoring efforts primarily through elected boards of 
directors. Ideally, external forces originated by competition in product markets and 
markets for corporate control interact to discipline dominant shareholders. Recently, 
under reinforced market regulation and with rising shareholder activism, pension funds 
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and mutual funds have increased efforts to exercise influence over dominant 
shareholders. Any individual corporate governance mechanism may fail in given 
circumstances. Market regulation is ineffective if its scope is too narrow or its provisions 
are feeble or out-of-date, and the rule of law is not enforced. The board of directors may 
be captured by dominant shareholders, may have too many or too few members, or 
appoint directors who are under trained or too busy. Weak boards may fail to provide 
adequate compensation for both executives and board members to redistribute wealth to 
shareholders. Monitoring by creditors and market regulators helps reduce the temptation 
for asset diversion. However, increased disclosure may impose additional costs on the 
firm not offset by the access to an alternative source of funding. When external financial 
markets are incipient, nonexistent, or too expensive in terms of interest rates and 
excessive monitoring privileges to creditors, equity represent the remaining source to 
finance investment opportunities not covered by internally generated funds. Blockholders 
are also potentially subject to expropriation; alternatively blockholders could collude with 
dominant shareholders to share a portion of the private benefits. 
Several authors have suggested the endogenous nature of a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms. In particular the endogeneity of ownership structures and firm 
performance has been emphasized (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Demsetz, and 
Villalonga, 2001; Lins, 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2007) and consequently, I propose a 
simultaneous equations system to analyze the complex interrelations between corporate 
governance mechanisms extending the work of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Switzer 
(2007) to an environment of a priori weak shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
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To minimize the negative effects of ownership concentration on firm value, Latin 
American firms resort to a number of different corporate governance mechanisms that are 
complements rather than substitutes. I find that while a discount is imposed on the value 
of firms due to the separation of ownership and control, blockholders detached from 
dominant shareholders assume monitoring roles and help curtail asset expropriation. 
Although multiple-class shares are common in some countries, firms with single-class 
shares are highly valued by market participants. I also find that Latin American firms are 
underleveraged and that the benefits and costs imposed by the passing of the Sarbanes-
Oxley act in 2002 have already been incorporated in other governance mechanisms. 
Beyond the large potential for private consumption, concentrated ownership may be 
prescribed in dynamic competitive environments. It may be a surviving strategy when 
shareholder protection is weak. I explore the motivations for outside investors to take 
large stakes to finance the firms' activities while facing expropriation, illiquidity and 
under diversification risks 
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the literature review section the original terminology is maintained when 
discussing the relation between this work and published papers. Some authors use the 
same expressions to refer to different concepts; in other cases similar concepts are 
denoted by different names. In contrast, accounting expressions are unequivocally exact. 
In general, each author addresses different concepts related to ownership structures using 
ad-hoc expressions that reflect the limitations of data availability. Therefore, for the 
literature review section I maintain the original word choice from the authors, and in 
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subsequent sections and in the next chapter I consistently use my own terminology to 
represent detailed ownership structures, as in the preceding chapter and the introductory 
chapter. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find interdependence among several control 
mechanisms for agency problems between managers and shareholders, in a sample from 
1987 including 383 large US firms. Using a simultaneous equations system, they find that 
the number of outside directors is not optimal. Conversely other control mechanisms: 
insider ownership, institutional ownership, ownership of blockholders, debt, the market 
for managerial talent and the market for corporate control are found to be used at the 
optimal level. 
Lins (2003) is concerned about the endogenous relation between ownership and 
firm value which voids making inferences about causality (firm value is lower as a result 
of expected costly agency problems/if a manager expects lower cash-flow he would tend 
to increase the discrepancies between his voting rights and cash-flow rights). He uses 
two-stage least squares regressions to account for endogeneity between ownership and 
firm value with the valuation equation in the structural model and the ownership equation 
in the first-stage model. He finds that after controlling for simultaneity, firm value is 
lower when managers' control exceeds ownership, and firm value is higher when the 
control rights of blockholders increase. However, the author also finds evidence of 
simultaneity with blockholders more likely to own control rights in highly valued firms, 
for his sample of 830 observations from 18 emerging economies in 1995. 
Switzer (2007) studies the simultaneous interactions between alternative 
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governance mechanisms and the value of small publicly-traded firms in Canada from 
1997 to 2004. He finds that firms cross-listed in the US, have higher market value after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed into law. Most of the corporate governance 
mechanisms are found to be substitutes. However, a disciplinary role is reserved for the 
market for corporate control. In contrast, those firms seem to use an excess of costly debt 
obligations which negatively affects firm value. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2007) analyze the relation between corporate governance, 
capital structure, ownership structures and firm performance for a sample of CRSP firms 
from 1999 to 2004. They use governance indexes, which by construction separate "good" 
and "bad" governance practices; a legitimate approach that nonetheless significantly 
differs from mine. I use a number of measures for corporate governance mechanisms in 
the raw form. The results of the analysis indicate whether they affect firm value in a 
positive or negative way, or not at all. At the optimal level the marginal benefits of using 
a governance mechanism just offsets the marginal costs. Consequently the results suggest 
whether a given mechanism is used in excess, not enough or just up to the optimal level 
by firms in the sample. Taking into account endogeneity problems, the formulation by 
Bhagat and Bolton (2007) shows significant correlation between corporate governance 
measures and contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance, but not 
correlation with stock market performance. 
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3.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
In this chapter I analyze the effects of the discrepancies between voting rights and 
cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders and other governance mechanisms on firm 
value. The level of some governance mechanisms, such as takeover activity is determined 
externally to the firm. Internally chosen mechanisms, such as the ownership of dominant 
shareholders are selected to offset environmental mechanisms (Switzer, 2007). Some 
mechanisms may not look individually optimal but they would be collectively optimal. 
The costs of changing the ownership of dominant shareholders may exceed the benefits 
and it may be optimal to maintain control of the firm. Therefore, other governance 
mechanisms adjust to maximize firm value. For example, cross-listing firms that opt for 
Level II or Level III ADR publicly listed programs are subject to high disclosure 
requirements. Similarly, debt financing increases outside monitoring. Both mechanisms 
may be used by dominant shareholders to pre-commit not to expropriate minority 
shareholders. 
In the introductory Chapter 1, departing from previous literature, I propose a 
detailed analysis of the identity of each shareholder. Voting rights and cash-flow rights 
are therefore aggregated only at the core of identified business groups. Then, the effects 
of ownership concentration on firm value are documented in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I 
offer additional contributions to the advancement of the literature. In addition to the 
measures for ownership structures, I compute a number of governance mechanisms in 
great detail for the Latin American sample including firm leverage, measures for takeover 
activity, board size, cross-listing, single/multiple-class shares, board independence, and 
the dual role of the CEO as chairman of the board. Then I analyze their collective effects 
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on firm value and their mutual interactions; controlling for firm characteristics such as 
firm size, stock price returns volatility, country effects and industry effects. The sample 
in this chapter is necessarily smaller with respect to that used in Chapter 2 because when 
I compute TOBINLAG the lag values of LogfTobin's Q), early observations including all 
data from year 2000 are lost. In addition, to calculate the governance mechanism 
measures some observations are sacrificed due to data unavailability. The database used 
for the analysis in this chapter consists of 935 observations; there is not data for 
Colombia from 2006 nor data for Venezuela from 2002 (see Table 3.1). 
Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders. The capability to expropriate hinges on the percentage 
of voting rights held by dominant shareholders. The discrepancies between voting rights 
and cash-flow rights create an incentive for dominant shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders. I compute two alternative ownership concentration measures to 
investigate the robustness of the results. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage 
of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders. 
The larger the difference, the greater the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. 
RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. 
The larger the ratio, the lower the incentive for expropriation. In the regression analyses 
of firm performance the coefficient estimates are expected to have opposite signs for the 
GAP1 and the RATI specifications. CFCON1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if dominant shareholders are family groups or corporations and zero otherwise. 
Blockholders are also potentially subject to expropriation; alternatively and depending on 
their identities blockholders could collude with dominant shareholders to share a portion 
50 
of the private benefits. TOP23 is the percentage of voting rights held by the second (or 
third) largest shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. 
CIGOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by combined institutional investors and 
governments excluding dominant shareholders. 
Firm leverage is computed as Total liabilities divided by Total assets (Leverage). 
I compute takeover activity (PACQ) as the fraction of acquisition deals announced, for 
targets in the same industry over the past five years, in five countries of the region 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela - see Table 3.1). Cross-listed firms have at 
least one related equity security traded in US stock exchanges subject to minimum 
liquidity constraints. Liquidity is measured as the average standard deviation of monthly 
stock price returns, for the previous 24 months for all the US equity securities related to 
the firm-year observation. In Table 3.2, the dummy variable CLISTING equals 1 for only 
40% (38lout of 935)6 of the observations, and equals 0 for firms without liquid related 
equities, for missing data and for related securities with null standard deviation for the 
monthly returns, as well as for the six cases in which the average standard deviations 
exceed 600%. Of these 73% are subject to increased disclosure which creates a more 
comfortable environment for global investors seeking portfolios diversification in 
emerging markets (Level II or Level III ADR publicly listed programs). High disclosure 
requirements are not bonding for unlisted over-the-counter Level I ADR programs and 
private placements under Rule 144A. However, only Level III and Rule 144A (42% of 
cross-listing) offer access to US primary capital markets while Level I and Level II allow 
access only to US secondary markets. In Figure 3.1, cross-listing observations include 
Other papers (see out-of-sample tests in Ellul, Guntay, and Lei, 2007; Boubakri, Cosset and Samet, 2008) 
study exclusively those firms with ADRs. 
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Level III ADR programs (31%), Level II ADR programs (42%), as well as OTC Level I 
programs (16%) and private placements under Rule 144A (11%). In Doidge, et al. (2006) 
50% of the Latin American observations correspond to cross-listed firms and 38% of 
these correspond to exchange listings. In the Latin American sample in Boubakri, Cosset 
and Samet (2008) 40% of the 76 ADR observations correspond to exchange listing 
programs. Thus, the Latin American database used in this work includes a larger 
proportion of exchange listing programs than previous published research. Nevertheless 
the CLISTING variable does not distinguish between public listing and unlisted 
programs. Since the inception of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002 the regulatory 
framework of financial markets has been upgraded and subsequently US stock exchanges 
have tightening listing requirements. A dummy variable (SOA) equals 1 for years after 
2002, and 0 otherwise. Both SOA and the interaction term CLSOA = CLISTINGxSOA 
between SOA and CLISTING are included to account for the costs and benefits of 
additional disclosure requirements. Since voting shares float less than non-voting shares I 
also compute a dummy variable which equals 1 for firms with single-class shares 
(SHRRTS) and 0 for firms with multiple-class shares as a measure for market monitoring 
(see Table 3.3). 
Analyzing data from five Latin American emerging economies I provide evidence 
of the relative stability over time of corporate governance mechanisms. In Table 3.4, I 
show the average coefficient of variation for a set of corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm characteristics in the sub-sample of publicly traded firms with multiple 
observations from 2001 to 2006. Panel A shows variables that remain constant for more 
than 50% of the firms; on average, the standard deviation is lower than the mean value of 
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the governance variable. For example non-floating shares are owned by named identified 
blockholders, as opposed to floating shares which are owned by unnamed anonymous 
atomistic minority shareholders. Since floating shares are scarce I compute dummy 
variables for firms with floating voting shares (Flotav) and for firms with floating non-
voting shares (Flotanv). Out of 198 firms, only 4 firms, issue or retire non-voting shares 
during the period of analysis. Similarly, only 23 firms issue or retire voting shares. Both 
these changes represent rational capital restructuring strategies initiated by dominant 
shareholders. The firm repurchases all floating shares along with some non-floating 
shares from dominant shareholders. Alternatively, the firm issues new shares, at the same 
time dominant shareholders sell a portion of their holdings to the public. Under both 
strategies, trading by dominant shareholders can be concealed by the capital restructuring 
of the firm. In contrast, the variables shown in Panel B fluctuate over time in most or all 
the firms, but the variations are small; on average the standard deviation is lower than 
twice the mean value. The corporate governance mechanisms under analysis in Table 3.4 
are further classified as firm specific characteristics (Firm) or industry characteristics 
(Ind.). All the industry characteristics are determined externally to the firm (Ext.). Some 
firm specific characteristics may be decided internally (Int.) by dominant shareholders, 
both during the initial design of the firm or during current operations. However, firm 
specific characteristics may also be externally determined (Ext.) by other stakeholders 
partially influenced by the decisions of dominant shareholders. In addition to the 
distinction between firm specific characteristics decided internally or externally, I 
classify corporate governance mechanisms as endogenous variables or predetermined 
variables. Predetermined variables are independent of current and future disturbances. 
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Lagged endogenous variables as well as current and lagged exogenous variables can be 
used as predetermined variables. The levels of endogenous governance mechanisms are 
chosen taking into account the interaction with given levels of other governance 
mechanisms and firm characteristics which are possible out of the control of the decision 
maker (internal or external to the firm). For example, dominant shareholders control the 
firm and decide whether the firm issue multiple-class shares, and how many shares of 
each class to retain. Indirectly dominant shareholders decide how many shares are left for 
other investors in the market. However, they can not directly decide the number of 
blockholders, their holdings, or their identities. Blockholders have more flexibility than 
dominant shareholders. Blockholders decide on the size of their stakes in the firm but are 
constrained by the holdings of other shareholders including dominant shareholders. In 
summary, the low variability of the corporate governance mechanisms that correspond to 
firm specific characteristics internally decided supports the assumed invariability of the 
number of board members (BSIZE), the number of insider board members (officers of the 
firms and family, family of founder), and the dual role of the CEO as chairman of the 
board (DUAL); variables for which data is available only for the 117 observations from 
2006. In addition, missing values are replaced with year-industry averages. Board 
independence (BIND) is calculated as 1 - (the number of insider board members) divided 
by (the number of board members). 
Firm size is calculated as the natural logarithm of Total assets (LSIZE) and the 
firm's internal volatility is measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock price 
returns over the previous 24 months (Volatility). In addition, to account for strict 
regulatory constraints I assign dummy variables to firms in the Utilities and Financial 
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industries. Similarly, I assign a dummy variable to firms in the Mining industry to 
account for the high volatility of commodity prices. Finally, country dummies capture 
differences in economic development, market size and overall corporate governance 
practices. The omitted country dummy corresponds to Brazil, the largest economy in the 
region. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Several authors have underlined the endogeneity of ownership structures and firm 
performance (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Demsetz, and Villalonga, 2001; 
Lins, 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2007). In this chapter, I propose a simultaneous equations 
system to analyze the complex interrelations between corporate governance mechanisms 
extending the work of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Switzer (2007) to an 
environment of a priori weak shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). The construction of the system follows the results of 
previous work, embraces parsimony precepts, and is constrained by the data available 
and identification conditions. The six equations system consists of one equation for the 
discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders (1), 
an ownership equation for the second largest shareholder (2), an ownership equation for 
institutional investors and government blockholders (3), a board independence equation 
(4), a leverage level equation (5) and a firm value equation (6). In the following notation 
the first sub index of estimated coefficients represents the local variable and the second 
7
 For example data on managerial compensation is unavailable, which may be justifiable by the high 
political risk and criminality in some countries. Shareholders would accept less disclosure to protect 
executives from kidnapping. In addition, intangible assets, capital expenditures, advertising expenditures 
and research and development expenditures are usually not reported by non-US firms because of their 
negligible amounts (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Holderness, 2007) 
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sub index denotes the equation number. 
Equation for the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for dominant 
shareholders: 
OWN = cti + p1;i*BIND + p2)i*CFCONl + p3,i*LSIZE + p4,i*PACQ + p5,, Volatility 
+ p6>I*CLISTING + p7,,*LAMBDA + p8,i*SOA + p9,i*CL_SOA + Pio,i*DUAL 
+ pn^SHRRTS + pi2;i*Mining + pi3;I*Financial + p,^Utilit ies + £1 (1) 
Ownership equation for the second largest shareholder: 
TOP23 = ct2 + pi,2*OWN + p2;2*CIGOWN + p3>2*BIND + p4,2*Leverage + p5,2*LSIZE 
+ p6j2*PACQ + p7,2*Volatility + p8>2*SOA + p9;2*CL_SOA + pi0>2*Mining 
+ pi
 1>2*Financial + Pi2,2*Utilities + e2 (2) 
Ownership equation for institutional investors and government blockholders: 
CIGOWN = a3 + Pi)3*OWN + p2,3*TOP2_3 + p3,3*BIND + p4;3*Leverage + p5,3*LSIZE 
+ p6j3*PACQ + p7)3*CLISTING + p8)3*LAMBDA + p9,3*SOA + p10;3*CL_SOA 
+ pn>3*NINSTI + p,2;3*Mining + Pi3>3*Financial + £3 (3) 
Board independence equation: 
BIND = a4 + p,,4*OWN + p2,4*TOP2_3 + p3,4*CIGOWN + p4j4* CFCON1 + p5,4*LSIZE 
+ p6,4*PACQ + p7)4*CLISTING + p8;4*LAMBDA + p9j4*SOA + pi0,4*CL_SOA + 
pi,>4*BSIZE + p12'4*DUAL + Pi3>4*s'HRRTS + s4 ' ' (4) 
Leverage level equation: 
Leverage = a5 + p,)5*OWN + p2,5*BIND + p3;5*LSIZE + p4;5*PACQ + p5,5*Volatility + 
p6,5*CLISTiNG + p7;5*LAMBDA + p8;5*SOA + p9,5*CL_SOA + P IO, 5 *T6BINLAG + 
pn,5*SHRRTS + p12,5*Mining+ p]3)5 financial + pi4j5*Utilities + pi5;5*Chile + 
Pi 6,5* Colombia + Pi7>5*Peru + p I 8 5* Venezuela + 85 (5) 
Firm value equation: 
TOBINQ = a6 + pi,6*OWN + p2,6*TOP2_3 + p3;6*CIGOWN + p4,6*BIND + 
p5;6*Leverage + p6>5*PACQ + p7,6*Volatility + p8,6*CLISTING + p9;6*LAMBDA + 
pI0,6*SOA + piij6*CL_SOA + Pi2;6*BSIZE + p]3)6*DUAL + p14,6*SHRRTS + Pi5,6*Chile 
+ Pi6,6*Colombia + pn;6*Peru + Pi8j6*Venezuela + ee (6) 
In equation (1), to investigate the robustness of the results, I use two alternative 
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measures of (OWN) the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for 
dominant shareholders: GAP1 and RATI. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage 
of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders. 
RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. 
When the voting rights exceed their cash-flow rights, the incentive for asset diversion is 
amplified. In the following paragraphs, the expected signs of estimated coefficients are 
analyzed for OWN=GAPl as a measure of the separation of ownership and control (for 
OWNNRAT1 the estimated coefficients are expected to have the opposite sign). 
Independent boards of directors make asset diversion more difficult, making excess 
voting rights over cash-flow rights of less interest for dominant shareholders as a means 
to expropriate minority shareholders. A negative coefficient of BIND is expected. Family 
groups and corporations as dominant shareholders would tend to hold more voting rights 
than cash-flow rights to take advantage of opportunities to expropriate minority 
shareholders. A positive coefficient of CFCON1 is expected. Nenova (2003) suggests 
that large firms are subject to greater scrutiny, which would increase the costs of 
extracting private benefits. In this case, dominant shareholders have a weak incentive to 
hold more voting rights than cash-flow rights in large firms. However, large firms also 
have fewer growth opportunities (Claessens et al., 2002) thus more assets under control 
increase the prospects for private consumption and dominant shareholders have a strong 
incentive to hold more voting rights than cash-flow rights. If the Nenova's (2003) 
argument prevails, a negative coefficient of LSIZE is expected. In industries with low 
takeover activity (as in most Latin American markets-see Table 3.1) dominant 
shareholders increase the excess voting rights over cash-flow rights since the risks of 
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losing control due to disciplinary takeovers are low, and engaging in asset diversion is 
relatively safe. A negative coefficient of PACQ is expected. When the stock market is 
unfavorable, expropriating minority shareholders increases the return on investment for 
dominant shareholders. Thus, dominant shareholders tend to increase the excess voting 
rights over cash-flow rights in firms with volatile stock prices or volatile output markets. 
Positive coefficients of both Volatility and Mining are expected. Doidge, et al. (2006) 
show that when private benefits are high, firms are less likely to cross-list in the US, 
because the high standards of transparency and disclosure and increased monitoring, but 
they do not find an effect for OTC, Rule 144A or London listings. Similarly, Lei and 
Miller (2008) find a significant relation between CEO turnover and firm performance for 
firms with Level II and Level III ADR programs, but not for Level I, Rule 144A and 
listings in London. A negative coefficient of CLISTTNG is expected. When the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board, dominant shareholders opportunistically expropriate 
minority shareholders using multiple-class shares to increase the excess voting rights 
over cash-flow rights. Thus, a positive coefficient of DUAL and a negative coefficient of 
SHRRTS are expected. Dominant shareholders tend to decrease the excess voting rights 
over cash-flow rights in any firm subject to strict regulatory constraints. On the other 
hand, operating in regulated environments requires strong negotiation bases. The signs of 
the coefficients of Financial and Utilities are of an empirical question. 
TOP23 is the percentage of voting rights held by the second (or third) largest 
shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. In equation (2), 
Li, Ortiz-Molina and Zhao (2007) find that institutional ownership in dual-class firms is significantly 
lower that in single-class firms in the US. However, institutional investor could build up voting power to 
influence corporate decisions. In contrast, getting involved in corporate governance results too expensive 
for individual investors, thus they place little value on voting rights. 
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TOP23, OWN and CIGOWN are closely related because blockholders can only buy 
shares left by dominant shareholders and institutional investors and government 
blockholders. When dominant shareholders have voting rights in excess of cash-flow 
rights blockholders take small positions on the firms' stock to reduce their exposure to 
expropriation. Thus, negative coefficients of both OWN and CIGOWN are expected. 
Independent boards of directors boost investor confidence and induce blockholders to 
take large positions on the firms' stock. A positive coefficient of BIND is expected. 
Dominant shareholders prefer debt over equity to finance firm growth since blockholders 
make it difficult to control the firm. Thus, little additional equity are issued for 
blockholders to acquire. In addition, highly leveraged firms are less attractive to 
blockholders because changes of control are less likely and bankruptcy risks are higher. 
A negative coefficient of Leverage is expected. Large positions in large firms result in 
undiversified portfolios for blockholders. In addition, blockholders reduce the holdings in 
risky firms and firms with volatile output markets. Negative coefficients of LSIZE, 
Volatility and Mining are expected. However, in industries with active takeover markets 
blockholders hold more voting rights to capture the premium in eventual changes of 
control. A positive coefficient of PACQ is expected. Exiting positions in regulated 
industries is difficult and lengthy because of pre-qualification requirements of the 
incoming investors. Negative coefficients of both Financial and Utilities are expected. 
CIGOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by combined institutional 
investors and governments excluding dominant shareholders. In equation (3), CIGOWN, 
OWN, and TOP23 are closely related because institutional investors can only buy shares 
left by dominant shareholders and other blockholders. In some cases governments hold 
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shares remaining from privatization processes. When dominant shareholders have voting 
rights in excess of cash-flow rights, which signals potential for asset diversion, prudent 
institutional investors take small positions on the firms' stock. Thus, negative coefficients 
of both TOP23 and OWN are expected. Institutional investors are attracted to firms with 
more independent boards. A positive coefficient of BIND is expected. Since large 
shareholdings by institutional investors increase monitoring, dominant shareholders 
privilege debt over equity leaving little need to issue additional equity. In addition, firms 
with high bankruptcy risks are less attractive to institutional investors. A negative 
coefficient of Leverage is expected. Institutional investors are attracted to large firms, for 
visibility, reputation concerns, cash-flow and dividends stability, as well as to cross-listed 
firms for their imposed increased disclosure and transparency. Positive coefficients of 
both LSIZE and CLISTING are expected. In industries with more takeover activity 
institutional investors hold more voting rights to participate and capture the premium in 
eventual changes of control. A positive coefficient of PACQ is expected. In addition, 
institutional investors are attracted to industries in which other institutional investors are 
also committed. A positive coefficient of NINSTI (the year-industry average number of 
combined institutional investors and government agencies with voting rights) is expected. 
Well diversified institutional investors have no reasons to shun any particular industry 
including regulated industries. They are as concentrated in any industry as the average of 
the market in the region (see Table 3.5). I have no a priori expectations about the signs of 
the coefficients of Mining and Financial. 
Board independence (BIND) is calculated as 1 - (the number of insider board 
members) divided by (the number of board members). In equation (4), independent 
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boards may result from relatively weak dominant shareholders and strong blockholders. 
A negative coefficient of OWN, but positive coefficients of TOP2_3 and CIGOWN are 
expected. Moreover, family groups and corporations as dominant shareholders tend, more 
than others, to capture the board. A negative coefficient of CFCON1 is also expected. 
Boards remain more independent in larger, more visible firms as well as in cross-listed 
firms due to imposed increased disclosure and transparency. Positive coefficients of both 
LSIZE and CLISTING are expected. In industries with active takeover markets, 
blockholders including institutional investors anticipating potential changes of control 
tend to gain seats on the board to participate in the merger decisions. A positive 
coefficient of PACQ is expected. Since large boards have more seats for independent 
directors, a positive coefficient of BSIZE is expected. A CEO that is also chairman of the 
board erodes the independence of the board of directors. A negative coefficient of DUAL 
is expected. Single-class shares increase the ability of minority shareholders to appoint 
independent directors. A positive coefficient of SHRRTS is expected. 
Leverage levels are computed as Total liabilities divided by Total assets 
(Leverage). In equation (5), dominant shareholders with voting rights exceeding cash-
flow rights privilege debt financing over equity, to maintain control. Moreover, they 
could also attempt to expropriate creditors through risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). A positive coefficient of OWN is expected. Independent directors support cost-
effective financing; if the access to credit is expensive in these markets they favor equity 
financing. A negative coefficient of BIND is expected. Large firms as well as cross-listed 
firms have higher credit ratings and benefit from lower interest rates. Positive coefficients 
of both LSIZE and CLISTING are expected. In industries characterized by frequent 
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changes of control, dominant shareholders use debt financing to thwart leverage buy-outs 
and discourage potential hostile bids. However, pre-committing to debt service deprives 
dominant shareholders from assets to expropriate. Nevertheless, a positive coefficient of 
PACQ is expected. Riskier firms face higher interest rates, thus a negative coefficient of 
Volatility is expected. Since access to favorable interest rates is conditioned to past firm 
performance, a positive coefficient of TOBINLAG is expected. Multiple-class shares are 
used to finance future investments without loss of control, reducing the need for debt. 
Conversely, firms with single-class shares may need to resort to debt financing more 
frequently. Therefore, a positive coefficient of SHRRTS is expected. Proven reserves of 
minerals serve to guarantee loans in volatile product markets. A positive coefficient of 
Mining is expected. Notwithstanding stable cash-flows, firms in regulated industries are 
subject to constraints on leverage levels. I have no a priori expectations of the coefficient 
signs of Financial and Utilities. Since access to debt varies from country to country, I use 
country dummies to capture differences in sovereign risk, political risk, operation of 
financial markets, regulatory environments and corporate governance approaches. 
TOBINQ is the natural logarithm of the Tobin's Q ratio. Tobin's Q ratios are 
computed as the sum of Total liabilities and Market value of equity divided by Total 
assets. In equation (6), excess voting rights over cash-flow rights for dominant 
shareholders signal potential for asset expropriation. Therefore, a valuation discount is 
imposed and a negative coefficient of OWN is expected. Blockholders, depending on 
their identity, may challenge dominant shareholders inclined to asset diversion. Positive 
coefficients of both TOP23 and CIGOWN are expected. Independent boards contribute 
to booster investor confidence and consequently help stock prices rising. A positive 
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coefficient of BIND is expected. With high levels of debt, firms pre-commit to use cash 
in hand to repay short term liabilities, reducing the risk of asset diversion (Jensen, 1986). 
Moreover, high debt may indicate future profitable growth opportunities (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). A positive coefficient of Leverage is expected. Active markets for 
corporate control motivate dominant shareholders to maintain high firm value reducing 
the risk of hostile takeovers. A positive coefficient of PACQ is expected. Rational 
investors expect higher returns from riskier firms. Therefore, a positive coefficient of 
Volatility is expected. Cross-listing expands the investor base and at the same time 
imposes increased disclosure requirements on the firm, which booster investor 
confidence. A positive coefficient of COSTING is expected. Large boards make room 
for directors with different expertise and perspectives and large business networks. A 
positive coefficient of BSIZE is expected. The dual role of the CEO as chairman of the 
board signals poor corporate governance practices and a valuation discount is imposed. 
However, concentrating power in a single executive provides flexibility for decision 
making. Therefore, a positive coefficient of DUAL is expected. Voting shares command 
control premiums over non-voting shares (Nenova, 2003), moreover voting shares are 
traded almost exclusively during changes of control. With multiple-class shares liquidity 
is driven by non-voting shares (Valadares and Leal, 2000), and market capitalization 
artificially shrinks when small numbers of voting shares trade at a discount. A positive 
coefficient of SHRRTS is expected. 
Cross-listing is a not random endogenous decision taken within the firm. Thus, 
the measures of firm value for cross-listed firms may suffer from self-selection bias 
(Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004). Heckman (1979) proposes a two-step method to 
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correct for selection bias. The first step is a probit regression in which the binary variable 
suspected of suffering from selection bias is regressed on its determinants. Then, the 
output from the first step is used to correct for selection bias. The determinants of the 
decision to cross-list are: firm value measured as the natural logarithm of the Tobin's Q 
ratio (TOBINQ), the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for 
dominant shareholders [OWN=(GAPl or RATI)], a measure of board independence 
(BIND) which is calculated as 1 - (the number of insider board members) divided by (the 
number of board members), the leverage level computed as Total liabilities divided by 
Total assets (Leverage), a measure of firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of 
Total assets (LSIZE), a measure of takeover activity (PACQ) computed as the fraction of 
acquisition deals announced, for targets in the same industry over the past five years, in 
five countries of the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela), idiosyncratic 
risk as measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock price returns over the 
previous 24 months (Volatility), the number of board members (BSIZE), an indicator for 
the dual role of the CEO as chairman of the board (DUAL), an indicator for 
single/multiple-class shares (SHRRTS), and country dummies. In the second step, the 
predicted value of the binary variable would be an instrument in the firm value equation, 
but I interrupt the process at this point. From the first step regression the inverse Mills 
ratio (LAMBDA) is retained. In every equation of the system in which the dummy 
variable CLISTING appears the variable LAMBDA is included as an additional regressor 
to correct for selection bias. This approach is also observed in Jog, Zhu and Dutta (2008) 
and Smirnova (2008). Two versions of the inverse Mills ratio are computed: LAMBDA1 
and LAMBDA2 to be used with the two alternative specifications of OWN: RATI and 
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GAP1 respectively. 
If the included endogenous variables are correlated with the disturbances then 
executing ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions results in biased and inconsistent 
estimates and instrument variables techniques are recommended. A Hausman (1978) 
specification test serves to determine whether endogeneity bias is present in the OLS 
estimates. Under the null hypothesis both the OLS and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression methods estimate consistent coefficients, and the OLS estimated coefficients 
are efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis only the 2SLS estimated coefficients are 
consistent. The test is performed simplifying each equation to include just one suspect 
endogenous regressor at the time. Corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics from other equations are used as instruments. The test statistic is x 
distributed with one degree of freedom. The test results from Table 3.6 suggest that some 
of the suspected endogenous variables would indeed induce endogeneity bias in the OLS 
estimates. Therefore, instrumental variables techniques are recommended. 
Then, I estimate the coefficients of the six equations using a 2SLS approach in 
which corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics from other equations 
are used as instruments (results not reported). However, in Table 3.7, the significant 
correlation coefficients between the residuals estimated from 2SLS regressions suggest 
that a system estimation approach such as the three-stage least squares (3SLS) should be 
used instead. The three-stage least squares estimator is a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator that uses a particular weighting matrix. In a 3SLS approach all 
identified parameters of the model are jointly estimated using the residuals from 2SLS 
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estimation in the weighing matrix which allows for possible contemporaneous 
correlations between the disturbances of different equations. Nevertheless, there is a 
trade-off between robustness and efficiency when estimating simultaneous equations 
systems. If all the equations are correctly specified a system estimation procedure (3SLS) 
is more efficient than a single equation estimation procedure such as 2SLS. However, if 
one equation in the system is misspecified, the 3SLS coefficient estimates may be 
inconsistent. Moreover, a 3SLS approach requires the additional assumption that any 
predetermined variable is predetermined in all equations. 
Table 3.8 shows that the necessary order condition for identification is satisfied 
for each equation. When normalization and exclusion are the only restrictions imposed to 
the equations, as in this system, the necessary rank condition reduces to the sufficient 
order condition (Wooldridge 2002, p. 220). Table 3.9 shows the descriptive statistics for 
the corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics used in the regressions. 
Table 3.10 shows the correlation coefficients between the regressors (both endogenous 
and predetermined variables) of the equations in the system. The results in Table 3.10 
also helped to the model development. For example, since the correlation coefficient 
between Utilities and NINSTI is 0.5687, to avoid co-linearity problems I have dropped 
Utilities from the ownership equation for institutional investors and government 
blockholders - equation (3). 
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3.4 RESULTS 
Table 3.11 shows the results from three-stage least square regressions for two 
specifications of the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for 
dominant shareholders: GAP1 and RATI. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage 
of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders. 
RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. 
Since the excess voting rights over cash-flow rights amplify the incentive for asset 
diversion. Latin American firms resort to a number of different corporate governance 
mechanisms that are complements rather than substitutes, as is revealed by the 
significance of the coefficients of the firm value equation. In modern theory of the firm, 
the elasticity of substitution measures the degree to which inputs can be combined in a 
production function. The flatter the isoquants the easier the substitution between inputs. 
Moreover, keeping other inputs constant, the solution to the cost minimization problem 
for a profit maximizing firm occurs when the marginal rate of technical substitution 
equals the ratio of the prices of the two inputs, for every level of output. For substitute 
corporate governance mechanisms, non significant estimated coefficients are expected on 
the firm value equation since they would offset each other. Substitute corporate 
governance mechanisms are used up to the optimal level and then other available and 
affordable governance mechanisms take over. With high ownership concentration and 
low protection for minority shareholders, some governance mechanisms become 
unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Thus, as in the short run situation, the firm may 
choose just some but not all inputs optimally. The substitution between inputs becomes 
more difficult, and the isoquants become more L-shaped. Corporate governance 
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mechanisms are used as long as they are available or affordable, but they do not 
necessarily reach an individual optimal. Other governance mechanisms are activated to 
complement the monitoring or disciplining effects. 
There are similarities and differences between the results found in this work and 
those presented in previously published research. Market characteristics and firm 
attributes seem to determine the role of corporate governance mechanisms and their 
interactions with firm value. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find 
interdependence among several control mechanisms for agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, and optimal use of control mechanisms except by board 
composition. In addition, Switzer (2007) finds that governance mechanisms appear to be 
substitutes for small-cap firms, and confirms some evidence of non-optimal deployment. 
Specifically, he shows that a disciplinary role is reserved to the markets for corporate 
control in small Canadian firms and that firm leverage is inversely related to 
performance. From a different perspective, Bhagat and Bolton (2007) show significant 
correlation between corporate governance measures and contemporaneous and 
subsequent operating performance, but not correlation with stock market performance. 
However, Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2007) suggest that standard econometric 
remedies to the endogeneity problems may be ineffective. They argue that panel data 
regression tests lack power because they rely purely on time series variation within firms, 
and there is very little time series variation in the contracting environment. As for a 
simultaneous equations approach, they claim that the models are too sensitive to the 
choice of instruments. They support their claims with simulations based on a structural 
model of the firm that they calibrate with available data. Nevertheless, the panel data 
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techniques used in Chapter 2, and the simultaneous equations model used here in Chapter 
3, are designed to address endogeneity problems attributed to different sources: 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity respectively, in the analysis of the ownership-
performance relations. 
The estimated coefficients of the firm value equation confirm the results from 
Chapter 2, in which a different approach is used. Therefore, similar results enhance the 
integrity of the analysis since different econometric designs attack different forms of 
endogeneity problems. In fact, this is one of the first research works to successfully apply 
both methodologies to the same sample, given the technical limitations and the data 
availability constraints. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 firm value is proxied by Tobin's Q 
ratios defined as the sum of Total liabilities and Market value of equity divided by Total 
assets while here in Chapter 3 firm value is proxied by the natural logarithm of Tobin's 
Q. Market participants anticipate significant private consumption and the excess of voting 
rights over cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders have negative effects on firm 
value. However, the second largest shareholder has the ability to prevent asset diversion. 
Moreover, as in Chapter 2 the identity of the second largest shareholder matters: family 
groups and corporations have both the capability and the incentive to obstruct asset 
expropriation. However, aggregated institutional investors and governments can also 
exercise effective monitoring over dominant shareholders. These results are consistent 
with the findings in Lins (2003) who shows that firm value is lower when managers' 
control exceeds ownership, and firm value is higher when the control rights of 
blockholders increase. 
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Multiple-class shares provide vehicles to raise funds while maintaining control, 
therefore non-voting shares are most frequently traded while voting shares are rarely 
traded, traded at a discount, or traded in blocks during a negotiated change of control. 
However, the positive significant coefficient of SHRRTS in the firm value equation 
suggests that firms with single-class shares, with one-share-one-vote structures, are 
highly valued by market participants. Although common in some countries (Table 3.3), 
multiple-class shares represent a high risk for asset expropriation and are associated with 
low firm valuation. The negative coefficient of CLISTING suggests that the increased 
disclosure requirements by US stock exchanges impose costs on the firms that may not be 
offset by additional benefits. Doidge, et al. (2006) show that when private consumption is 
high, firms are less likely to engage in exchange listed programs because of the high 
standards of transparency and disclosure and increased monitoring, but their results do 
not hold for OTC, Rule 144A or London listings. Besides, the significant coefficient of 
LAMBDA (the inverse Mills ratio) indicates that it is effectively correcting for self-
selection bias introduced by the CLISTING variable and emphasizes the notion that 
additional disclosure negatively affects firm value. Cardenas (2007) documents that a 
significant number of foreign issuers have delisted their ADRs from the NYSE and that 
the level of new additions has plunged since 2002. He suggests that the costs of 
compliance with section 404, related to the certification of internal controls, are 
determinant elements in the cost-benefits analysis to cross-list in US markets. Similarly, 
Boubakri, Cosset and Samet (2008) find that after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, firms from emerging markets and with low protection for minority shareholders are 
more likely to choose ADR programs which provide access to primary capital markets in 
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the US, either under Rule 144 A with low disclosure requirements or Level III with higher 
disclosure requirements respectively. If the capital markets of US and of the UK are 
equally integrated in world markets, corporations should be indifferent between listing in 
the US and in London. When I augment the definition of the CLISTING variables to 
include related equities listed in any foreign stock exchange, the results (unreported) are 
maintained. The estimated coefficients of SOA and CLSOA are both not significant, 
suggesting that the benefits and costs imposed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
in 2002 have already been incorporate in other corporate governance mechanisms. In 
contrast, Switzer (2007) finds that Canadian small-caps subject to Sarbanes-Oxley 
experience an increase in market valuation, concluding that the costs of enhanced 
disclosure and compliance are exceeded by their benefits. 
According to the significant estimated coefficients of BSIZE (negative) and BIND 
(positive) the boards in Latin American firms are perceived as having too many directors, 
who nonetheless are unable to guarantee enough independence. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) find that the number of outside directors is also not optimal for large US firms. 
However, Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) find that board composition has no effect on 
the performance of Canadian firms, and negatively affects the performance of family 
controlled firms. The negative estimated coefficient of PACQ implies that the markets for 
corporate control in Latin America are too weak to have disciplinary effects on firm 
value. On average, only 12% of the firms in the same industry have been acquired during 
the past five years (see Table 3.9). Therefore, the experience and history of acquisitions is 
too modest to induce potential synergies. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find 
that the effects of the corporate control activity are statistically insignificant. Nenova 
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(2003) also indicates that the markets for corporate control are relatively inactive in her 
sample that includes Brazil and Chile. However, recent large mergers (i.e. in the mining 
industry) may contribute in the future to change the negative perception of takeover 
activity. In contrast, Switzer (2007) finds that the markets for corporate control exert a 
positive influence on firm performance. In addition, Schilles (2006) shows that the 
conflict of interest between shareholders deprives investors from LBO gains, for a sample 
of French, German and US firms. 
As in Chapter 2, the three-stage least square regression results here in Chapter 3 
also suggest that Latin American firms are underleveraged. According to the pecking 
order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), dominant shareholders deciding on capital 
structures and debt levels, prefer debt and little additional voting and non-voting equity 
are issued for blockholders to invest. Equity are issued only in bad states of the world and 
dominant shareholders concerned with maintaining control would even forego investment 
opportunities with positive net present values if debt financing (underdeveloped financial 
markets) is unavailable or becomes extremely expensive in terms of interest rates and 
excessive monitoring privileges to creditors. However, additional interest payments of 
increased debt impose discipline on dominant shareholders, consistent with the free cash-
flow theory of agency problems (Jensen, 1986). Thus, using more debt would increase 
monitoring by creditors, building investor confidence and increasing firm value as long 
as debt financing is comparatively competitive. Switzer (2007) finds that small Canadian 
firms seem to use an excess of costly debt obligations which negatively affects firm 
value. In contrast Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find that the effects of firm debt are 
statistically insignificant. Thus, when the interactions between several control 
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mechanisms are considered the effect of debt on firm value is not consistent across 
samples. Market characteristics and firm attributes seem to determine the role of firm 
leverage. Additional research is needed on this topic. Finally, the R is not reported for 
the 3SLS estimate because unlike in the OLS case, the sum of squared 3SLS residuals 
cannot be divided between the explained variation and the unexplained variation 
(Hayashi, 2000) 
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
To minimize the negative effects of ownership concentration on firm value, Latin 
American firms resort to a number of different corporate governance mechanisms that are 
complements rather than substitutes. I find that while firm value suffers from a stock 
market discount due to the separation of ownership and control, blockholders 
independent of the dominant shareholders assume monitoring roles and help curtail asset 
expropriation. Although multiple-class shares are common in some countries, firms with 
single-class shares are highly valued by market participants. I also find that the benefits 
and costs imposed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in year 2002 have already 
been incorporated in other governance mechanisms. Using a completely different 
approach, the findings from Chapter 2 are confirmed with respect to the stock market 
discount as well as with respect to the monitoring role of blockholders. An additional 
finding from Chapter 2 is confirmed: more debt financing will contribute to an increase in 
the value of these firms as it makes feasible growth feasibly by direct investment while 
preserving control. Unfortunately the access to debt financing remains constrained and 
too expensive in these markets. 
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Chapter 4 
MARKET LIQUIDITY AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE WITH WEAK 
PROTECTION FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EVIDENCE FROM 
BRAZIL AND CHILE 
This chapter analyzes the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock 
market liquidity in environments of high ownership concentration and weak shareholder 
protection. The discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights create an 
incentive for dominant shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and 
blockholders (outside investors). Traditionally, the ultimate defense strategy for an 
expropriated investor is to exit the position, provided that there is sufficient market 
liquidity. In principle, this should not be a problem for a stock in the local index. Facing 
expropriation risk minority shareholders could close their positions through the stock 
market without suffering a large discount. However, with illiquid markets the last resort 
of exiting an unfavorable position vanishes. In addition, to the extent that blockholders 
such as local pension funds have few diversification opportunities and their funds 
increase overtime, they are themselves locked into their positions and they would rather 
increase monitoring than close their inventories. Moreover, a run by blockholders may 
hurt minority shareholders more than private consumption by dominant shareholders. 
Since large stakes by blockholders reduce the availability of floating shares, the 
monitoring role of institutional investors has a high cost in terms of market liquidity. 
However, ownership concentration and concurrent corporate governance mechanisms in 
Brazilian and Chilean firms have a stabilizing effect and contribute to reduce information 
asymmetry, allowing providers of liquidity to post narrow spreads. 
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4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The financial literature on the effects of corporate governance and ownership 
structures on market liquidity is scarce and recent. Moreover, when analyzing different 
markets the jargon may significantly differ from one study to the other. In particular, 
diverse expressions are used to refer to liquidity providers, market makers, dealers, 
traders and speculators. Furthermore, the control of the firms is assigned to different 
parties. Some papers discuss managerial ownership whereas other papers analyze 
aggregated ownership. The measures of ownership I propose in this and the previous 
chapters are the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights for dominant 
shareholders. Dominant shareholders may have both the capability and the incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders. The capability to expropriate hinges on the percentage 
of voting rights held by dominant shareholders. To determine the incentive to expropriate 
I compute two alternative measures of the discrepancies between voting rights and cash-
flow rights, to investigate the robustness of the results. Since dominant shareholders are 
the largest shareholders who may be members of business groups the voting rights and 
cash-flow rights have been aggregated accordingly. In the literature review I maintain the 
original word choice from different authors and in subsequent sections I consistently use 
the terminology that corresponds to the markets I analyze in Brazil and Chile. 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) discuss a theoretical model for stock markets as 
monitors of managerial performance. The markets for corporate control as well as 
compensation schemes tied to firm performance are vehicles for managerial discipline, 
contingent on market liquidity. Concentrated ownership hinders the chances of 
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disciplinary hostile takeovers to succeed. In addition, concentrated ownership reduces 
market liquidity and therefore the benefits of market monitoring fade away. In liquid 
markets, speculators invest in researching information about potential firm value. As a 
consequence of liquidity trading the information is only partially revealed by stock prices 
and the speculators earn profits from trading with liquidity traders. Nevertheless, liquidity 
traders require earning zero expected returns; otherwise they would invest on fixed 
income securities. Thus, liquidity traders should be allowed to originally purchase shares 
at a discount and the founder entrepreneur bears the costs of public trading during the 
IPO. In anticipation, the entrepreneur retains a portion of shares in an attempt to cut his 
costs, decreasing the profits for the speculators, and at the same time reducing market 
liquidity and diminishing the ability of the market to monitor the managers. Fewer 
analysts find it profitable to follow the firm and stock prices become less informative. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) model the dealers' bid-ask spread as a tradeoff 
between expected loss to informed traders and expected gains from liquidity traders. A 
wide (narrow) bid-ask spread reduces (increases) potential loss to informed traders but 
also expected revenues from liquidity traders. The authors analyze the dealers' dilemma 
as if the traders receive two free options: a call option with strike price equal to the ask 
price and a put option with strike price equal to the bid price. The dealer believes that the 
"true" stock price is around the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, therefore both the call and 
the put options are out of the money from his perspective. Liquidity traders accept the 
loss of exercising the out of the money option while informed traders have the choice not 
to trade with the dealer and the dealer never gains from trading with informed traders. 
Only those informed traders that believe the post-trade price will fall outside the bid-ask 
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spread would exercise their options and trade. 
Rubin (2007) examines the ownership-liquidity relations for a sample of large US 
firms from 1999 to 2003. In his framework, ownership levels (all the investors in a class) 
proxy for trading activity while ownership concentration (block holdings) proxies for 
adverse selection-information asymmetry. Ownership concentration quantifies the 
incentive of few shareholders to obtain, analyze, and trade on information. The author 
finds that liquidity is mainly determined by the ownership of institutional investors. 
Liquidity increases with ownership levels and decreases with ownership concentration. 
Therefore, improved monitoring comes at the cost of reduced liquidity. 
Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) examine the effects of corporate governance on 
stock market liquidity using an index of 24 governance attributes related to financial and 
operational transparency and to shareholder protection. They hypothesize that poor 
governance gives rise to greater information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
investors and that this asymmetry adversely affects liquidity. Consequently, liquidity 
providers are likely to post wider spreads for stocks of firms with poor corporate 
governance. They find that better governance leads to higher stock market liquidity as 
measured by narrower spreads, higher market quality, smaller price impact of trades, and 
lower probability of information-based trading for a sample of NASDAQ, NYSE, and 
AMEX firms from 2001 to 2004. 
Departing from the financial paradigm of frictionless efficient markets, Stoll 
(2000) formalizes the concept of friction as the price concession paid for immediacy. The 
bid-ask spread as a measure of total friction reflects transaction costs, inventory costs, 
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market power, and asymmetric information. Transaction costs are real economic costs 
(labor and capital) incurred to route, execute, clear, and settle orders. In addition, 
suppliers of immediacy (market makers) demand a premium for assuming inventory risks 
and holding undiversified portfolios. Dealers with market power increase the spread 
relative to their costs to extract monopoly rents. Since quotes are adjusted with a delay, 
the spread also compensates market makers for loss when trading with more timely or 
better informed traders. 
4.2 MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
Ellul et al. (2007) find that differences on the nature (technology-auction process 
vs. automatic execution) of the stock exchanges matter in terms of the sensitivity of small 
orders to the quoted spread. When given the choice, some investors are willing to forego 
price improvement to gain execution speed. Trading costs seem to be a secondary 
consideration for impatient investors with small orders. Stoll (2000) finds significant 
larger frictions in the NASDAQ dealer market compared to the NYSE/AMSE auction 
market. He speculates on the role of electronic markets to reduce real and informational 
friction. Therefore, to begin the analysis of ownership structures and liquidity in Brazil 
and Chile), a qualitative discussion of the stock exchange characteristics is in order, with 
respect to trading platforms and market participants. 
BOVESPA is currently the only stock trading center in Brazil and the largest one 
in Latin America comprising about 70% of the volume of trades carried out in the region. 
Since its 2007 corporate restructuring, it is no longer a not-for-profit institution. Today, 
trading is exclusively carried out through an electronic system. A minimum quantity of 
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securities and a maximum spread are set for market makers' offers according to average 
trading volumes and asset volatility respectively. Multiple market makers may be 
accredited for each asset or market in a competitive market making model. Market 
makers may be accredited to trade in several assets or to simultaneously trade the same 
asset in various markets. Market makers may conduct their business independently or 
may be engaged by the issuer or any holder of securities willing to make a market for 
such securities. The issuing corporation is thus allowed to take part in this process to 
improve the liquidity of its own securities in the market. 
The Santiago Stock Exchange is an Open Stock Company. Stock market 
transactions are performed through both the electronic system and the trading floor. In 
addition, the Electronic Stock Exchange, which exclusively uses electronic trading 
systems, operates in direct competition with the Santiago Stock Exchange. Since 2001, 
the Santiago Stock Exchange incorporates the function of market makers. The liquidity 
induced by the market makers' actions allows shareholders to be exempted from capital 
gain taxes. Market makers operate either for an issuer account or on their own account. 
There may be multiple market makers for each security and they may trade in multiple 
securities. They have to continuously post bid and ask quotes within an established 
minimum volume and maximum spread. Market makers may short-sell securities and are 
exempt from trading fees when providing liquidity. 
In summary, trading is concentrated in few venues in both markets, and the 
principal exchanges have a corporate structure and a strong regulatory framework. While 
trading is mainly conducted through electronic systems, the trading floor exists. Market 
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makers subject to competitive models are fundamental to create market liquidity. Some 
fiscal and competitive advantages are available for traders, issuers and institutional 
investors who support market liquidity. Given the similarities and the different 
characteristics of the stock markets across the countries under study, controlling for firm 
origin is carried out in the following analysis. 
4.3 LIQUIDITY MEASURES 
To analyze the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock market 
liquidity I calculate measures of market liquidity which are related to information 
asymmetry. In principle, liquidity providers will impose a wider bid-ask spread on the 
securities of firms with poor corporate governance in environments of weak shareholder 
protection. I compute six measures of stock market liquidity: equally-weighted spread, 
time-weighted spread, effective spread, realized spread, intraday price impact, and daily 
price impact. These order-driven measures are correlated to adverse selection costs that 
derive from concentrated ownership structures, and are indirectly related to stock market 
liquidity. In contrast, measures directly related to trading activity such as depth, share 
volume, dollar volume, and number of trades or turnover could not be obtained from the 
data available. Adverse selection costs reveal the probability that market makers 
(liquidity providers) trade with informed investors (Rubin, 2007). Market makers 
mitigate losses from trading with informed traders by quoting wide spreads and reducing 
the number of shares they offer in response to an increase in the probability of informed 
trading. Wide spreads in turn, discourage liquidity traders who observe an increase in 
trading costs and an augmentation of illiquidity risks. Therefore, they abstain from 
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trading in such unfavorable conditions and migrate to other financial products such as 
fixed income securities and commodities. In the Latin American sample, approximately 
26% of the trades occur outside the bid ask spread compared to 4.83% in Ellis, Michaely 
and O'Hara (2000). 
In Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) the equal-weighted spread is the implicit cost for 
market orders when a trade occurs at the quoted price without price improvement. This 
spread can also be interpreted as the premium risk adverse liquidity providers demand in 
order to bear inventory risk. The equal-weighted spread (SPRE) is calculated as the 
difference between the ask and bid quotes, divided by the quoted midpoint. The time-
weighted spread (WSPRE) is computed as the equal-weighted spread multiplied by the 
number of five minutes intervals that the last trade price was standing. Time weighting 
takes into account the order activity clustering and the no-activity clustering documented 
by Ellul et al. (2007). 
If the quoted midpoint represents the prevailing price perceived by liquidity 
providers and transactions occur at prices within the quotes, then the equal-weighted 
spread represents only the upper limit of execution costs. Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) state that the effective spread is closer to the actual transaction 
costs incurred by traders. The effective spread (EFFEC) is calculated as the absolute 
difference between the trade price and the quoted midpoint, dividend by the quoted 
midpoint. Correspondingly, Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) define the realized spread as 
the cost of trading at prices inside the posted bid and ask quotes. The realized spread 
(REAL) is computed as the signed difference between the trade price and the quoted 
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midpoint five minutes after the quote, divided by the contemporaneous quoted midpoint. 
To label the trades as buyer or seller initiated I use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm 
which classifies a trade as buyer-initiated if it is at or above the quoted midpoint (closer 
to the ask price) and seller-initiated otherwise. At the midpoint the trade is reclassified as 
seller-initiated if the previous price change was negative ("tick test"). Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) also use Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm; Rubin (2007) uses 
both, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm for NYSE/AMEX firms and the Ellis, 
Michaely and O'Hara (2000) algorithm for NASDAQ firms. Chung, Elder and Kim 
(2008) use the Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) algorithm to sign the realized spread. 
Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) define the price impact of trades as the extent to 
which an asset can be bought or sold without affecting its price. If a trade conveys no 
new information, its price impact should be zero. However, an information motivated 
trade initiated by a buyer would raise the price while a seller initiated trade would lower 
the stock price. The intraday price impact (IMPA) is calculated as the signed difference 
between the quoted midpoint five minutes after the quote and the actual quoted midpoint, 
divided by the actual quoted midpoint. The signing convention for the realized spread is 
also used for the intraday price impact measure. Rubin (2007) affirms that liquid markets 
can accommodate trades with little impact on prices. The daily price impact (AVEDI) is 
computed as the ratio of the daily absolute return to dollar valued volume. Liquid stocks 
would require a large dollar volume before observing a price change. 
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4.4 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
I study Brazilian and Chilean publicly traded firms, most of whom are members 
of the respective local exchange index. Using data from Bloomberg, I compute the 
intraday liquidity measures at five minutes intervals, and then I average them over the 
three month period from September to November 2006. The TAQ database allows Rubin 
(2007) to calculate the effective spread, the realized spread and the intraday price impact 
each minute. However, Ellul et al. (2007) recognize that humans require time to mentally 
process market conditions and submit orders. They aggregate each type of order flow 
over a variety of time intervals from five seconds to five minutes. Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2008) also indicate that investors need time to absorb and act on new 
information. They focus on five-minute intervals as a compromise between the errors on 
assigning trades as either buyer-or seller-initiated and the predictability of future returns 
and order imbalances. Rubin (2007) constructs quarterly ownership and liquidity 
variables from 12:00 to 13:00 while Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) average liquidity 
measures annually. Ellul et al. (2007) compute values for each five-minute interval, from 
9:30 to 16:00 during the week of April 30 to May 4, 2001. In the present study, up to 
twelve time intervals of five minutes per hour are included for trading hours from 7:30 h 
to 17:55 h during trading days. To calculate the intraday measures of liquidity every bid 
and ask quotes are assumed to last at most two hours within the same trading day, but 
those intraday measures are kept only for actual trades. A total of 5006 five minutes 
intervals are retained as the liquidity measures are calculated only for firms which have at 
least 1000 trades during the three month period. The intraday measures are averaged for 
each firm. After matching the ownership database with the liquidity measures, only 72 
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firms (14 Chilean and 58 Brazilian) are retained from the original database of 329 firms 
spanning five countries. The sample size, though smaller than in previous chapters is 
coherent with the samples in related studies. Ellul et al. (2007) analyze the 48 most 
actively traded NYSE stocks and 100 additional randomly selected NYSE stocks whereas 
Nenova (2003) acknowledges that including the bid-ask spread as a proxy for liquidity 
differences would have severely limited her sample size. 
To gauge the interaction between corporate governance and market liquidity I 
regress the six liquidity measures on ownership concentration characteristics, corporate 
governance mechanisms and several control variables. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) 
suggest that to profit from both efficient market monitoring and the benefits of control, 
the firm should issue two classes of shares. The subordinate class would be widely 
distributed to encourage monitoring of performance and the regular shares would be 
closely held for control. This is precisely the case in the Brazilian market (Valadares and 
Leal, 2000). To investigate the robustness of the results, the analysis is conducted over 
alternative measures for the ownership characteristics of dominant shareholders: 
TOP1VR, GAP1, and RATI. The first variable (TOP1VR) is the percentage of voting 
rights held by dominant shareholders, which represents the capability of dominant 
shareholders to extract firm value. The next two alternative variables measure the 
separation of ownership and control and the incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the 
percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the 
percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights. The larger the GAP1 
(RATI), the greater (lower) the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. In the 
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liquidity regression analysis the signs of the estimated coefficients of GAP 1 and RATI 
are expected to have opposite signs. Blockholders with undiversified portfolios and 
limited opportunities to close the position would enhance monitoring. In alternative (but 
unreported) model specifications I include measures of blockholders' ownership, for 
example TOP2_3 is the percentage of voting rights held by the second (or third) largest 
shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. In addition, 
INS OWN is the percentage of aggregated voting rights held by all institutional investors 
excluding dominant shareholders. 
The corporate governance mechanisms included in the analysis are: the number of 
board members (BSIZE), a measure of board independence (BIND), an indicator variable 
for cross-listing in the US (CLISTING), an indicator variable for single/multiple-class 
shares (SHRRTS), and a measure of takeover activity (PACQ). Board independence 
(BIND) is calculated as 1 - (the number of insider board members) divided by (the 
number of board members). Cross-listing firms that opt for Level II or Level III ADR 
publicly listed programs are subject to high disclosure requirements which are not 
required for unlisted over-the-counter Level I ADR programs and private placements 
under Rule 144A. However, only Level III and Rule 144A offer an access to US primary 
capital markets while Level I and Level II allow access just to US secondary markets. 
Cross-listed firms have at least one related equity security traded in US stock exchanges, 
with a minimum of liquidity. Liquidity is measured as the average standard deviation of 
monthly stock price returns, for the previous 24 months for all the US equity securities 
related to the Latin American firm-year observation. The dummy variable CLISTING 
equals 1 for about 60% (43 out of 72) of the observations, and equals 0 for firms without 
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liquid related equities. Cross-listing observations include Level III ARD programs (28%), 
Level II ADR programs (48%), as well as OTC Level I programs (5%) and private 
placements under Rule 144A (19%). Since shareholders' rights are more at risk, with 
voting shares floating less than non-voting shares I compute a dummy variable which 
equals 1 for firms with single-class shares (SHRRTS) and 0 for firms with multiple-class 
shares as a measure of market monitoring. I compute takeover activity (PACQ) as the 
fraction of acquisition deals announced, for targets in the same industry over the past five 
years, in five countries of the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). In 
alternative (but unreported) model specifications I include an indicator variable for the 
dual role of the CEO as chairman of the board (DUAL). 
The control variables included are firm age (DAYS) computed as the time elapsed 
since the company went public; firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of Total 
assets (LSIZE), and three customary control variables: average daily dollar volume 
(dollarvolume), the inverse of the stock price (dstockp), and the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns (dvolatility) used in Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) and Rubin (2007). 
In addition, I assign industry dummies to account for strict regulatory constraints in the 
Utilities and Financial industries. Similarly, I assign a dummy variable to firms in the 
Mining industry to account for the high volatility of commodity prices. Finally, a country 
dummy which equals 1 for Brazilian firms and 0 for Chilean firms capture differences in 
economic development, market size and overall corporate governance practices. With the 
exception of dollarvolume, dstockp, and dvolatility, which are exclusive to this chapter, 
the definition of all other variables is consistent with previous chapters. 
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4.5 RESULTS 
In Table 4.1, dominant shareholders hold between 5.47% and 99.99% of voting 
rights on the firms (TOP1VR). First, the possibility of independent managers is excluded 
when the largest shareholders have such a concentration of voting rights. Second, the 
median excess voting rights over cash-flow rights is 20.92% (GAP1). Thus, ownership is 
heavily concentrated on the hands of dominant shareholders. Moreover, they not only 
have the capability but also the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders because 
when assets are removed from the firm the cost to dominant shareholders is 
proportionally lower than the cost to other shareholders. The second largest shareholder 
has on average 8.64% of voting rights (TOP23) and aggregated institutional investors 
only 5.24% (INSOWN). Both variables have large variances and sometimes they are 
nonexistent, therefore the role of blockholders as monitors for dominant shareholders 
may be diminished. The board of directors for firms in the sample have a median of 8 
directors (BSIZE) of which on average 67% are independent (BIND). Only 36% of the 
firms have single-class shares (SHRRTS), which is adverse for limiting asset 
expropriation, but 60% of the firms have securities listed in an US stock exchange which 
guarantees better disclosure (CLISTING). The CLISTING variable does not distinguish 
between public listing and unlisted programs but public listings dominate 3 to 1. 
Moreover, only 19% of the firms have a CEO that is also chairman of the board (DUAL). 
However, the markets for corporate control seem too disperse across industries to have a 
disciplinary effect (PACQ). In the sample only 17% of the firms are utilities, 6% are 
financial institutions and 4% are mining companies; these industries are identified 
because of their strict regulatory constraints and high product market volatility 
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respectively. 
Table 4.2 shows high correlation among the alternative measures of market 
liquidity (p range between 0.2963 and 0.9935) and negative correlation between those 
and the corporate governance mechanisms: BSIZE (p range between -0.3342 and 
0.3479), BIND (p range between -0.2271 and -0.2715), and COSTING (p range between 
-0.4351 and -0.4732). Thus, individual corporate governance mechanisms have a 
potential for reducing adverse selection problems. This potential is revealed by lower bid-
ask spreads indicating more liquid markets. The joint effects of several corporate 
governance mechanisms are exposed by the regression results in Table 4.3 where 
ordinary least squares (OLS) robust standard errors are reported. The estimated 
coefficient of most corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. BIND, BSIZE, PACQ, 
SHHRTS) are negative which indicates the role of corporate governance to enhance 
market liquidity. The increased transparency reduces information asymmetry and induces 
providers of liquidity to post narrow spreads since they anticipate lower risks of trading 
with informed parties. In addition, the liquidity measures are positively related to the 
daily volatility and negatively to trading volume as in Chung, Elder and Kim (2008). 
Cross-listing (CLISTING) is found not to significantly affect market liquidity. 
Consistently, Cardenas (2008) examines delisting Mexican firms and finds that increased 
liquidity was not achieved by cross-listing. In view of the increased costs of compliance 
associated with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is related to the 
certification of internal controls, some firms decide to concentrate trading in local 
markets. 
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Available floating shares are scarce; therefore the measures of ownership 
concentration require a careful interpretation. Large stakes by blockholders reduce the 
number of floating shares. Only 22.32% of voting rights (Floatv) and 40.66% of cash-
flow rights (Floater) are associated with floating shares (Table 4.2). Therefore, as 
observed by Rubin (2007), the monitoring role of blockholders in general, and 
institutional investors (INSOWN) in particular, seems to have a high cost in terms of 
market liquidity However, ownership concentration by dominant shareholders 
contributes to reduce information asymmetry, allowing providers of liquidity to post 
narrow spreads. With a lower probability of trading with informed investors, transaction 
costs are lower, and in that sense markets are more liquid. The incentive for dominant 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders materializes by extracting rents from 
the firm through private consumption, which requires a solid and stable position of 
control. Dominant shareholders do not obtain the majority of their rents from informed 
trading, which would be easily spotted, probably illegal, and risky in terms of loss of 
control. Dominant shareholders would participate only in operations of change of control 
or would not trade at all. Therefore, a large incentive for dominant shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders through private consumption sends a reassuring signal 
to liquidity providers: that the most feared of informed investors would not trade and it is 
relatively safe to post narrow spreads. 
In unreported regressions, I have included the variables TOP23 and DUAL; 
however, the estimates coefficients of both variables are always insignificantly different 
from zero whether they are included together or individually, while the other results are 
maintained. Therefore, I have omitted them from the model specifications in Table 4.3. 
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Finally, we also observe high R s in the regressions, on the range from 0.5 to 0.79 which 
corresponds also to the values presented in related work by Chung, Elder and Kim (2008) 
and Rubin (2007). 
4.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights create an incentive 
for dominant shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and blockholders. Facing 
expropriation risk minority shareholders could close their positions through the stock 
market without suffering a large discount. In principle, this should not be a problem in 
liquid markets nor for stocks in the local index. In addition, blockholders could assume 
monitoring roles or collude with dominant shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders. However, large stakes by blockholders reduce the availability of floating 
shares. Therefore, the monitoring role of institutional investors seems to have high costs 
in terms of market liquidity. Moreover, only block trades that change control will create 
value for investors, but most voting shares are already on the hands of dominant 
shareholders. Nevertheless, ownership concentrations by dominant shareholders and 
concurrent governance mechanisms have stabilizing effects and contribute to reduce 




In this thesis I analyze the role of ownership structure as one of the leading 
corporate governance mechanisms. Ownership concentration is pervasive around the 
world, and prevalent in Latin American markets. These markets are also characterized by 
weak formal protection for minority shareholders. Moreover, the interests of the largest 
shareholders are so important that they assume quasi managerial functions. Thus the role 
of the managers as independent decision makers with the potential for creating agency 
problems is secondary. The high ownership concentration and more precisely the 
discrepancies between voting rights and cash-flow rights translate into a conflict of 
interest between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. The excess voting 
rights over cash-flow rights for dominant shareholders creates an incentive to expropriate 
minority shareholders. Blockholders (outside investors) are also potentially subject to 
expropriation; alternatively blockholders could collude with dominant shareholders to 
share a portion of the private benefits. 
In Chapter 1, I offer a detailed characterization of the ownership structures in 
these markets. Shareholders are identified and categorized as Family members, 
Corporations, Institutional Investors and Government. Then, their affiliations to business 
groups are recognized, and the voting rights and cash-flow rights are aggregated 
accordingly. One of the challenges for corporate governance studies in emerging markets 
is the absence of compelling databases. This effort contributes to the analysis in 
subsequent chapters, and is the foundation for future research. 
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In Chapter 2,1 use panel data techniques to unveil the effects of the separation of 
ownership and control on firm value. This is one of the first analyses that apply panel 
data techniques in corporate governance studies, and certainly the first to use them in the 
Latin American region as an investment destination. I present evidence that the market 
anticipates the potential for asset diversion and consequently a discount is imposed on the 
value of public firms. However, blockholders do not collude with dominant shareholders. 
Moreover, some blockholders have the potential for monitoring dominant shareholders, 
and the market seems to value this role. Given the large potential for private 
consumption, the existence and frequency of blockholders demands further investigation. 
Since their portfolios are undiversified and they face expropriation risks, other 
governance mechanisms should be in place to secure risk-adjusted return on investment. 
In Chapter 3, I analyze the relations between several corporate governance 
mechanisms and in particular the interactions with ownership structures and firm value. 
Using a system of simultaneous equations I find that many corporate governance 
mechanisms are active at the same time. Thus they are complements rather than 
substitutes in the response to an environment of weak protection for minority 
shareholders. Of particular interest is the role of governance mechanisms directly linked 
to stock markets: cross-listing and single/multiple-class shares; and mechanisms directly 
linked to the organization of the board of directors: board size and board independence. 
The costs imposed by cross-listing exceed the expected benefits. Firms with multiple-
class shares are common in the region but not highly appreciated by investors. Small 
boards and more independent directors are rewarded with high firm value. However, the 
dual role of the CEO as chairman of the board is not of much concern. In addition, the 
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markets for corporate control are not active enough to have a disciplinary role. Using a 
completely different approach, the findings from Chapter 2 are confirmed with respect to 
the stock market discount as well as with respect to the monitoring role of blockholders. 
An additional finding from Chapter 2 is confirmed: more debt financing will contribute to 
the value of these firms as it makes feasible growth by direct investment while preserving 
control. Unfortunately the access to debt financing remains constrained and too expensive 
in these markets. 
In Chapter 4, I turn to the investigation of the effects of ownership concentration 
and the separation of ownership and control on market liquidity. With high potential for 
private consumption, a liquid market, with the possibility of quickly closing a position is 
one condition for blockholders and minority shareholders to invest. I show that a number 
of corporate governance mechanisms including ownership by dominant shareholders 
converge to reduce asymmetric information and increase market transparency. Providers 
of liquidity are thus encouraged to post smaller spreads. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1.1. Ownership of dominant shareholders and firm value 







4 . 9 9 1. 10 
IOI 
Figure 1.2. Ownership concentration and interconnectedness of firms in the sample 
Sub-network of firms and shareholders linked directly (or indirectly) to "Caixa Prev Func BB - Previ" 
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Figure 3.1. Cross-listed shares in the US, distribution of ADRs by Level. 
381 observations, 87 firms. 
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Table 1.1. Distribution of firms by primary control levels 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 




















































































































































































Table 1.2. Average annual % growth of Gross Domestic Product 

































Source: 2006 World Development Indicators 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table4_a.htm 
Table 1.3. Relative sizes of security markets 
Average and standard deviation of Value of total listed shares to GDP and Value of total shares traded on 
the stock market exchange to GDP, 2001- 2006 
Country Stock market capitalization / 
GDP 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Stock market total value 
traded / GDP 









































Source: Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, (2000), "A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure," World Bank Economic Review 14, 597-605 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics 
1179 observations, 242 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2000-2006. 
Tobin's Q ratios are defined as the sum of Total liabilities and Market value of equity divided by Total 
assets. TOP1VR is the percentage of voting rights held by the dominant shareholder. GAP1 is the 
difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant 
shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights held 
by dominant shareholders. CFCON1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if dominant shareholders 
are corporations or family groups, and zero otherwise. TOP23 is the percentage of voting rights held by 
the second (or third) largest shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. BHS 
is the sum of the percentage of voting rights held by all blockholders (Family+Corporation+Other) 
excluding dominant shareholders. BHD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an aggregated blockholder exists, 
as defined in BHS, and zero otherwise. INSOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by institutional 
investors excluding dominant shareholders. GOVOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by 
governments excluding dominant shareholders. CIGOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by 
combined institutional investors and governments excluding dominant shareholders. Size is Total assets in 
USDS MM. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of Total assets. Leverage is computed as Total liabilities 
divided by Total assets. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock price returns over 
the previous 24 months. The column Count indicates how many observations are not zero for those 





































































































Table 2.2. Dataset characteristics: geographic distribution by investor category and time 



































































































Table 2.3. Distribution of voting rights and cash-flow rights by shareholder category 
Number of observations, minimum, maximum and average percentage voting rights and cash-flow rights, 
by shareholder category for non-floating shares and floating shares. The column Sample refers to all 





























































Table 2.4. Distribution of voting rights and cash-flow rights for three largest 
shareholders 
Only non-null holdings are reported in this table 





2nd largest shareholders 
Group members 
Independents 
3r largest shareholders 
Group members 
Independents 
Panel B: Percentage voting 




Mean Voting Rights 
Mean Cash-flow Rights 
Maximum CFR 
Minimum CFR 
2" largest shareholders 
Minimum VR 
Maximum VR 
Mean Voting Rights 
Mean Cash-flow Rights 
Maximum CFR 
Minimum CFR 
3r largest shareholders 
Minimum VR 
Maximum VR 
Mean Voting Rights 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.1. Average PACQ and number of observation per country and year 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Takeover activity PACQ is the fraction of acquisition deals announced, for targets in the same 









































































average 0.2 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.19 
33 N. obs. s 9 9 5 2 
Table 3.2. Selected statistics per country and cross-listed shares in the US 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Average RATI, GAP1, TOBINQ, LSIZE, Volatility, Leverage and number of observations. 
Cross-listing COSTING is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with liquid equity securities listed on a 
US stock exchange, and zero otherwise. Liquidity is measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
price returns, over the previous 24 months. 
Panel A: CLISTING = 0, not listed in the US (554 obs.) 











































Panel B: CLISTING = 1, listed in the US (381 obs., 87firms) 












































Table 3.3. Selected statistics per country and shareholders rights 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Average RATI, GAP1, TOBINQ, LSIZE, Volatility, Leverage and number of observations. 
Shareholders rights SHRRTS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with single-class shares (voting 
shares), 0 for multiple-class shares. 




















































































Table 3.4. (In)Variability of corporate governance mechanisms 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Average coefficient of variation (mean/standard deviation) for firms with two or more annual observations 
for which there is some variability-the standard deviation is not null. 
• Firm/Ind: Firm specific characteristic / industry characteristic 
• Ext./Int.: Decided externally to the firm / decided within the firm 
• Endo./Pred.: Endogenous variable / predetermined variable 
Panel A: Governance mechanisms with little variability 










































































Panel B: Governance mechanisms with high variability 

































































































(*) This variable is defined in Table 3.9 
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Table 3.5. Distribution of firm value (Tobin's Q) by industry and country 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 






























































































































































Table 3.6. Hausman (1978) specification test for endogeneity 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Test statistics are x2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom. 
Ho: OLS and 2SLS estimators are both consistent, OLS estimators are efficient. 
Ha: OLS estimators are inconsistent, 2SLS estimators are consistent. 
Panel A: OWN= RATI 















































































reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
Panel B:OWN=G API 













































































reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 10% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
reject Ho at 5% 
Table 3.7. Correlation coefficients between the residuals of the 2SLS regressions 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Printed values are significant at 10%, stars indicate significance at 5% level. 



































































Table 3.8. Order condition for identification 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Total number of endogenous variables in the system = 6 
Total number of predetermined variables in the system = 20 
(a) Number of endogenous variables included less 1 in the equation (right-hand-side endogenous variables) 
(b) Number of predetermined variables excluded from the equation 
A given equation is identified if (b) > (a) 
OWN=GAPl or RATI 
Equation 






























Table 3.9. Descriptive Statistics 
935 observations, 198 firms from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela for 2001-2006. 
Panel A: Governance mechanisms 
GAP1 is the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held 
by dominant shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of 
voting rights held by dominant shareholders. TOP23 is the percentage of voting rights held by the second 
(or third) largest shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. CIGOWN is the 
percentage of voting rights held by combined institutional investors and governments excluding dominant 
shareholders. Board independence (BIND) is calculated as 1 - (the number of insider board members) 
divided by (the number of board members). Leverage is computed as Total liabilities divided by Total 
assets. Tobin's Q ratios are defined as the sum of Total liabilities and Market value of equity divided by 
Total assets. TOBINQ is the natural logarithm of the Tobin's Q ratio. CFCON1 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if dominant shareholders are corporations or family groups, and zero otherwise. Firm 
size is calculated as the natural logarithm of Total assets (LSIZE). Takeover activity PACQ is the fraction 
of acquisition deals announced, for targets in the same industry over the past five years, in five countries of 
the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). Volatility is measured by the standard deviation 
of monthly stock price returns over the previous 24 months. Cross-listing CLISTING is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for firms with liquid equity securities listed on a US stock exchange, and zero otherwise. 
LAMBDA 1 is the inverse Mills ratio from a Heckman type regression, is used with RAT1.LAMBDA2 is 
the inverse Mills ratio from a Heckman type regression, is used with GAP1. SOA is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for observations after year 2002, and zero otherwise. CL_SOA is the interaction term between 
CLISTING and SOA. BSIZE is the number of board members. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. TOBINLAG is the lag value of TOBINQ. 
Shareholders rights SHRRTS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with single-class shares (voting 
shares), 0 for multiple-class shares. NISTI is the year-industry average number of combined institutional 
investors and government agencies with voting rights. Mining is a dummy variable equal to 1 for mining 
firms, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable equal to 1 for financial firms, and zero otherwise. 
Utilities is a dummy variable equal to 1 for utility firms, and zero otherwise. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru 



















































































Table 3.9. Continued 


























































































































Panel B: Additional governance measures 
BG1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the dominant shareholder belongs to one of the 225 identified 
business groups. Shholdrs is the number of identifiable named shareholders holding non-floating shares. 
BHS is the sum of the percentage of voting rights held by all blockholders (Family+Corporation+Other) 
excluding dominant shareholders. BHD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an aggregated blockholder exists, 
as defined in BHS, and zero otherwise. INSOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by institutional 
investors excluding dominant shareholders. NINSOWN is the number of institutional investors, excluding 
dominant shareholders which hold voting rights. GOVOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by 
governments excluding dominant shareholders. NGOVOWN is the number of government agencies 
excluding dominant shareholders which hold voting rights. NINSTIV is the annual industry average 
number of institutional investors with voting rights. NINSTICF is the annual industry average number of 
institutional investors with cash-flow rights. NFAMV is the annual industry average number of families 
with voting rights. NFAMCF is the annual industry average number of families with cash-flow rights. 
NCORPV is the annual industry average number of corporations with voting rights. NCORPCF is the 
annual industry average number of corporations with cash-flow rights. NGIV is the annual industry average 
number of government agencies with voting rights. NGICF is the annual industry average number of 
government agencies with cash-flow rights. Flotav is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has 
outstanding floating voting shares, and zero otherwise. Flotanv is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has outstanding floating non-voting shares, and zero otherwise. ControlXX indicates the number of firms in 
which the dominant shareholder controls more than XX% of voting rights. The column Count indicates 
how many observations are not zero for those variables. 
121 
Table 3.9. Continued 



































































Max Min Std.Dev. Count 
1 
18 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
72 Brazilian and Chilean firms, averages over a minimum of 1000 and a maximum of 5006 five minute 
intervals, September-November 2006. The equal-weighted spread (SPRE) is the difference between the ask 
and the bid, divided by the quoted midpoint. The time-weighted spread (WSPRE) is computed as the equal-
weighted spread multiplied by the number of five minutes intervals that the last trade was standing. The 
effective spread (EFFEC) is the absolute difference between the trade price and the quoted midpoint, 
dividend by the quoted midpoint. The realized spread (REAL) is the signed difference between the trade 
price and the quoted midpoint 5 minutes after the quote. The intraday price impact (IMPA) is the signed 
difference between the quoted midpoint five minutes after the quote and the actual quoted midpoint, 
divided by the actual quoted midpoint. The daily price impact (AVEDI) is the ratio of the daily absolute 
return to dollar valued volume. INSOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by institutional investors 
excluding dominant shareholders. TOP1VR is the percentage of voting rights held by the dominant 
shareholder. GAP1 is the difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-
flow rights held by dominant shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the 
percentage of voting rights held by dominant shareholders. TOP23 is the percentage of voting rights held 
by the second (or third) largest shareholder provided that it is not an institutional investor or government. 
BSIZE is the number of board members. Board independence (BIND) is calculated as 1 - (the number of 
insider board members) divided by (the number of board members). Shareholders rights SHRRTS is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with single-class shares (voting shares), 0 for multiple-class shares. 
Cross-listing COSTING is a dummy variable equal 1 for firms with liquid equity securities listed on a US 
stock exchange, and zero otherwise. DUAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board, and zero otherwise. Takeover activity PACQ is the fraction of acquisition deals announced, 
for targets in the same industry over the past five years, in five countries of the region (Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). DAYS is the time elapsed since the company went public. Firm size is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of Total assets (LSIZE). Mining is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
mining firms, and zero otherwise. Financial is a dummy variable equal to 1 for financial firms, and zero 
otherwise. Utilities is a dummy variable equal to 1 for utility firms, and zero otherwise. Dollarvolume is the 
average daily dollar volume. Dvolatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns Dstockp is the 
inverse of the stock price. Shholdrs is the number of identifiable named shareholders holding non-floating 
shares. Brazil is a dummy variable equal to I for Brazilian firms, and zero otherwise. Chile is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for Chilean firms, and zero otherwise. Flotav is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has outstanding floating voting shares, and zero otherwise. Flotanv is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm has outstanding floating non-voting shares, and zero otherwise. Floatv is the percentage of voting 
rights of floating shares. Floatcf is the percentage of cash-flow rights of floating shares. The column Count 
indicates how many observations equal 1 for the dummy variables only. 









































































Table 4.1. Continued 
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Table 4.1. Continued 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3. Regression results 
OLS regression with robust standard errors. 72 Brazilian and Chilean firms, 2006. The equal-weighted spread 
(SPRE) is the difference between the ask and the bid, divided by the quoted midpoint. The time-weighted spread 
(WSPRE) is computed as the equal-weighted spread multiplied by the number of five minutes intervals that the 
last trade was standing. The effective spread (EFFEC) is the absolute difference between the trade price and the 
quoted midpoint, dividend by the quoted midpoint. The realized spread (REAL) is the signed difference between 
the trade price and the quoted midpoint 5 minutes after the quote. The intraday price impact (IMP A) is the signed 
difference between the quoted midpoint five minutes after the quoted and the actual quoted midpoint, divided by 
the actual quoted midpoint. The daily price impact (AVEDI) is the ratio of the daily absolute return to dollar 
valued volume. TOP1VR is the percentage of voting rights held by the dominant shareholder. GAP1 is the 
difference between the percentage of voting rights and the percentage of cash-flow rights held by dominant 
shareholders. RATI is the ratio of the percentage of cash-flow rights to the percentage of voting rights held by 
dominant shareholders. INSOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by institutional investors excluding 
dominant shareholders. BSIZE is the number of board members. Board independence (BIND) is calculated as 1 -
(the number of insider board members) divided by (the number of board members). Shareholders' rights 
SHRRTS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with single-class shares (voting shares), 0 for multiple-class 
shares. Corss-listing CLISTING is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with liquid equity securities listed on a 
US stock exchange, and zero otherwise. Takeover activity PACQ is the fraction of acquisition deals announced, 
for targets in the same industry over the past five years, in five countries of the region (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela). DAYS: the time elapsed since the company went public Firm size is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of Total assets (LSIZE). Industry dummies for firms in the Mining, Financial, and Utilities 
industries. Country dummy for Brazilian firms. Average daily dollar volume (dollarvolume). The standard 
deviation of daily stock returns (dvolatility). The inverse of the stock price (dstockp). 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3. Continued 


































































































































































significant at 1% 
EMPA 
0 
0.753 
0 
0.060* 
0.00001 
0.888 
-0.00001 
0.793 
0 
0.946 
0 
0.102 
0.00014 
0.593 
-0.00003 
0.451 
0.00003 
0.096* 
-0.00001 
0.866 
0.00003 
0.461 
0.00004 
0.413 
-0.00008 
0.333 
-0.00009 
0.001*** 
0.00013 
0.013** 
0.00001 
0.305 
72 
0.523 
AVEDI 
-0.00758 
0.005*** 
0.00347 
0.641 
0.18572 
0.434 
-0.04362 
0.733 
-0.02882 
0.064* 
-0.00006 
0.144 
0.94978 
0.299 
-0.39364 
0.002*** 
0.02901 
0.694 
0.4964 
0.038** 
0.66333 
0.173 
-0.0425 
0.766 
0.23567 
0.46 
-0.62749 
0.000*** 
-0.18332 
0.504 
-0.04314 
0.106 
72 
0.723 
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